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Abstract 
We continue our ongoing research into the global defense industrial base—
with a view to better understanding its increasingly complex nature.   Our aim has 
been to understand defense industrial developments, place those developments in 
context, and find explanatory paradigms suitable for better explanation of ongoing 
trends. 
In this report we consider the ongoing travails of the KC-X program, the C-27, 
and the rise of unmanned aerial combat systems (UAVs, UCAVs, UASs).  The KC-X 
has been an excellent example of the complicated influences that shape the U.S. 
defense acquisition system—bureaucratic, legalistic, and political.  It has also 
illustrated (to this point) the capability of those influences to impose significant 
delays on even relatively simple projects.  The C-27 is an excellent example of the 
increasingly globalized nature of aerospace industries—and their complex 
relationships with defense customers. 
The rise of UAVs has been a significant event for military affairs, defense 
industrial firms, and military organizations.   In this report, we discuss UAVs in the 
context of the ongoing competition between the U.S.and its allies against terrorist-
insurgent opponents.  We also discuss the organizational issues associated with 
UAVs—through the Raven UAV and its integration with the U.S. Army’s support 
structure. 
Keywords: Global defense industrial base, defense industrial developments, 
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I. Introduction 
This report continues an ongoing project aimed at a better understanding of 
the international defense marketplace—a complicated environment that is becoming 
ever more so.  Our intent has been threefold: to understand current defense 
industrial developments, place those developments in context, and find explanatory 
paradigms suitable for better explanation of ongoing developments in the 
international defense industrial base. 
Our first report in this series, Echoes Across the Pond: Understanding EU-US 
Defense Industrial Relationships (Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 2008a), considered three 
current episodes in the transatlantic defense-industrial complex(es).  The cases 
under consideration were the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the UK Defense 
Industrial Strategy, and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company 
(EADS)-Airbus KC-30 aerial tanker proposal.  We also discussed three well-known 
analytical perspectives as candidates for understanding those cases: offsets in 
international defense trade, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), and Corporate 
Strategy models.  In the style of Graham Allison (1977, 1999), we essayed 
explanations of all of our “cases” using all three paradigms.  We assessed the 
offsets perspective as best for understanding the JSF, TCE for the UK’s Defense 
Industrial Strategy, and corporate strategy models for the EADS-Northrop Grumman 
KC-30 proposal. 
Our second report, “New Patterns of Collaboration and Rivalry in the US and 
European Defense and Aerospace Industries” (Franck, Lewis, & Udis, 2008b), 
emphasized defense industrial firms—with consideration of Boeing’s Model 787 
development and production; the KC-45 (or KC-X) competition (through the Summer 
of 2008), which involved the EADS-Northrop Grumman alliance and the Boeing 
Company; and European defense firms’ strategies (BAE Systems, EADS, 
Finmeccanica) for entering the North American defense market through direct 
investment.  Two major themes that emerged were the increasing technical and 
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managerial complexity in modern aerospace systems, and the increasing power of 
relatively agile defense suppliers relative to their increasingly bureaucratic 
customers. 
Our third report, “Global Cooperation and Competition in the Defense and 
Aerospace Industries” (Franck, Lewis, Udis, 2010), continued inquiries along the 
same general lines of this overall project.  We continued our exploration of the 
international defense industrial “terrain,” and our search for useful paradigms.  The 
KC-X competition (third installment) considered the explanatory power of two views 
of the defense establishment customers in the defense marketplace: the traditional 
model of the sovereign monopsonist, vs. the Governmental Politics perspective 
(Model III) offered by Graham Allison (1977, 1999).  We considered the remarkable 
travails of the A-400M military transport development effort—which came in very late 
and much over budget.  (There are also likely some performance problems lurking.)  
The A-400M (military) was a useful companion piece with our previous Boeing 787 
(commercial).  Both cases illustrate the increasing complexity of large, international 
development projects—and the problems that can emerge.  A potentially significant 
change in the structure of the international defense marketplace is the possibly -
emerging Nordic defense bloc.  In this instance, we found a rather complex story—
with significant attractions to the other Nordic states, but also close and useful 
relationships with partners outside of the Nordic region (especially the United 
States). 
In this report, we discuss three topics with the same aims as above.  First is 
the latest chapter of the KC-X story.  Our concern is primarily keeping a continuous 
track on the remarkable set of events leading (or not) to an aerial tanker 
replacement for the KC-135. 
This is clearly not a case of delays due to technological immaturity.  The KC-
X—whether based on Boeing or Airbus designs—is well known, with tanker 
conversions of the A330 (or A310) and B767 already operational in other air forces.  
Wikipedia articles on the Boeing KC767 (2010), A310 MRTT (2010), A330 MRTT 
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(2010) summarize nicely the essentials of these systems’ characteristics and their 
histories.  The KC-X case illustrates well the bureaucratic, legal, and political 
obstacles to acquisition in the United States—and their potential to sidetrack the 
acquisition process. 
Second is the C-27 transport—an Italian design in wide use worldwide.  The 
C-27 is a good example of increasingly international projects in the aerospace 
industry and the sometimes complicated relationships between aerospace 
enterprises and their defense customers. 
We have devoted a great deal of attention to our third topic, Unmanned Air 
Vehicles (UAVs).  We take on a range of aerial vehicles developed for 
reconnaissance, or both reconnaissance and strike.  We also attempt to place the 
rapid growth of UAVs in the U.S. inventory in context; we believe this is a major 
development both in military affairs and also in the defense industrial base.  
Unmanned vehicles are a remarkable development within the two ongoing 
Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs).  Within that context, UAVs are an important 
continuation of the reconnaissance-strike embodiment of the Information Technology 
(IT)-enabled RMA first demonstrated in the Gulf War of 1991.   
Broadly speaking, UAVs have been a useful counter to the ongoing RMA 
associated with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist-insurgent movements.  
Among other things, UAVs, with their longer endurance, provide a better 
approximation to continuous battlefield presence.  This leads to a number of useful 
military capabilities—which we discuss further in this report.   
The effect on the international defense marketplace has, quite possibly, been 
even more profound.  The relative simplicity and cheapness of UAVs means that 
these systems can be developed with company resources outside the “normal” 
defense acquisition system, with its highly complex and potentially burdensome 
processes.  A closely related point is that defense systems in this realm are open to 
a much wider range of suppliers than the highly complicated and expensive 
aerospace systems—such as fifth-generation fighters.  In fact, a large number of 
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enterprises have been able to finance UAV development projects with their own 
funds (beyond the defense giants such as Boeing and Lockheed-Martin).  Countries 
with high technology and small size, such as Israel, are world leaders in unmanned 
systems (as discussed in some detail in Chapter IV,B). 
Specifically, we consider the case of the UAV market through perspectives 
offered by a number of the leading suppliers, whose representatives have chosen to 
remain anonymous.  We also consider the Raven—a small tactical UAV developed 
by the US Army for use by lower-echelon combat units.  Our focus is first on the 
unorthodox methods used to develop and field this particular UAV, but also on how 
the Raven was integrated into the Army’s “system” for continuous support.
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II. The Ongoing KC-X Drama 
A. Introduction  
We’ve dealt with this particular issue much longer than anticipated, originally 
expecting to wrap up the topic of KC-X source selection some time in 2008 following 
a contract award in February of that year.  However, Boeing successfully appealed 
the award to the KC-30 proposal—with the GAO recommending a rerun of the 
source selection process.  An attempt to do that quickly in 2008 fell apart—due, 
among other things, to Boeing’s threat not to respond to the revised Request for 
Proposal (RfP). 
And the story has continued with the next KC-X source selection decision 
scheduled for the Fall of 2010, which has come and gone.  Our purpose in this 
report is to continue a useful narrative of this affair, with a view to providing a more 
comprehensive assessment at some future time that combines the research in our 
first four reports (including this one), and probably some of our future reports. 
Although aerial tankers are not terribly glamorous, they are very important.  
And this particular case provides interesting perspectives—most of them negative—
on the U.S. defense acquisition system.  In fact, this particular program should have 
been very simple.  Both candidate aircraft (the Boeing KC-767 and the Airbus KC-
30) are very mature technically.  In fact, both are proven concepts (or mostly proven) 
with variants of both aircraft types having been developed for a number of 
customers, including Japan and Italy for the KC-767, and the UK and Australia for 
the KC-30.  Despite that, the source selection process has drug out over one full 
decade in its various incarnations.  The KC-X story nicely highlights many 
shortcomings of the U.S. source selection system and hopefully will, at the end of 
the day, suggest ways to improve it. 
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B. Third Attempt: Overview of the Current KC-X Competition1 
Following the termination of the buy-and-lease proposal for KC-767s in 2003, 
the successful protest of the KC-45 contract award to the KC-30 in 2008, and the 
aborted re-competition of 2008, the third (perhaps fourth) chapter of the dismal KC-X 
saga opened in 2009.  On 16 September 2009Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, 
announced a new effort to replace the KC-135 aerial tanker fleet (Amani, 2009).   
On 25 September 2009, the Air Force published a draft Request for Proposal 
(RfP), which included a fixed-price contract award for 179 aircraft with a heavy 
emphasis on cost (U.S. Air Force, 2009).  With the number of aircraft (but not total 
capability) fixed, the announced emphasis on cost seemed initially to strongly favor 
the smaller Boeing KC-767 over the EADS-Northrop Grumman KC-330.  
Accordingly, the EADS-Northrop Grumman team made multiple threats to withdraw 
from the competition (as related, e.g., in Tiron, 2009, 1 December).  These 
statements had little substantive effect on the final RfP that was issued on 25 
February 2010. (Gertler, 2010, 14 May, esp. pp. 6–7).   
The RfP included a large number of requirements (key performance 
parameters) in the following areas: 
(1)  aerial refueling of all current and programmed fixed-wing receiver 
aircraft including same-sortie boom and drogue capability; 
(2)  fuel offload capability at least as good as the KC-135R;  
(3)  ability to operate globally;  
(4)  significant airlift capability;  
(5)  tanker receiver air refueling capability;  
(6)  crew protection for operations in chemical and biological environments; 
                                            
1 Franck, Lewis & Udis (2008a, 2008b, 2010) taken together provide a fairly complete narrative of the 
KC-X affair.  Also, Wikipedia KC-X (2010), updated 13 August, contains an accurate, well-written, and 
reasonably brief summary. 
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(7)  interoperability for network centric operations;  
(8)  various defense and survivability features; and  
(9)  simultaneous, multi-point drogue refueling capability (U.S. Air Force, 
2010, 25 February). 
.  
An Air Force-Department of Defense (DoD) briefing explained the RfP of 
February 2010 and the selection process (Lynn, Carter, & Donelly, 2010; see Figure 
1).  The first stage in the selection process is a screen for 373 “mandatory 
requirements” (scored as pass/fail).  The second is a calculation of “total proposed 
price,” to include a transitional five years of contractor support of the system.  Third 
is an adjustment for system effectiveness, fuel costs, and military construction costs, 
resulting in a Total Adjusted Price (TAP).  If the TAPs are within 1%, then 93 non-









Figure 1. Summary of KC-X Source Selection Criteria 
               (adapted from Lynn et. al., February 2010) 
Continuing in the spirit of Allison’s Model III (Franck, et al., 2010), the rest of 
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Trade Organization (WTO), Northrop-Grumman, EADS, Boeing, third bidders—
United Aircraft (maybe), and U.S. Aerospace-Antonov. 
C. World Trade Organization (WTO) Litigation 
The issue of subsidies for both Airbus and Boeing has been a matter of 
charges, counter-charges, and intermittent attempts at settlement.  In 2004, the 
Airbus (and EADS) consortium was the subject of a complaint alleging improper 
subsidies being an integral part of the Airbus consortium in the category of Trade in 
Large Civil Aircraft.  After a prolonged process, the WTO reported its findings and 
conclusions in 2010 (World Trade Organization [WTO], 2010d, 16 August).   
The WTO concluded that various policies of EU member states were specific 
subsidies prohibited by international trade agreements.  They took the form of (a) 
launch aid, (b) infrastructure grants and provisions, (c) various transfers of 
ownership interests, (d) equity infusions, and (e) research and development funding.  
The report also concluded that the U.S. complaint had established the subsidies in 
question displaced goods provided by U.S. suppliers (primarily Boeing) throughout 
the world.  The report recommended prompt action to “remove the adverse affects or 
… withdraw the subsidy” (WTO, 2010a, 30 June, pp. 1049-1053). 
However, that report specifically avoided any suggestions for steps to 
implement the recommendations—citing no requirement to do so, nor any request 
from the United States (WTO, 2010a, p. 1053).  The EU appealed the 
determinations made in the DS316 report on 21July 2010 (WTO, 2010d, 16 August). 
The U.S. was likewise the subject of a complaint filed in 2005.  Using a similar 
process to the complaint against the EU, the WTO was originally expected to 
complete its work in July 2008.  At that time, the Chairman of the Panel convened to 
settle this dispute revised the completion estimate to 2009.  In December of 2009, 
the completion date was revised to June 2010.  The estimate for publishing the 
interim report was again revised to September of 2010, with completion in early 
2011 (WTO, 2010c).   
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The European Union (EU) deplored the timing of the DS316 Report—given 
that the results of the investigation of complaints against the U.S. had been delayed.  
The EU has been found to have offered prohibited subsidies to the Airbus 
consortium (including the A330), but nothing was expected to be released 
concerning Boeing until after the due date for responses to the KC-X RfP.   
An interim WTO report2 on the complaint against the U.S. similarly found 
prohibited subsidies to Boeing.  Some observers (e.g., Drew, 2010b) have 
concluded that the two reports neutralized each other—leaving no clear advantage 
for either Boeing or Airbus; however, that is far from a consensus opinion.  Boeing 
spokespersons and supporters have stated that the WTO findings regarding Airbus 
violations were far more significant than those against Boeing (Miller & Michaels, 
2010).  Also, Senator Patty Murray, a Democrat from Washington State, 
reintroduced legislation to take those improper EU subsidies into account as a KC-X 
source selection criterion  (Tiron, 2010).  Additionally, there are reports that Senator 
Murray’s position played well politically back in Washington State (Blumenthal, 
2010). 
The implications of the WTO disputes are interesting, but not yet fully 
resolved.  With both Airbus and Boeing found to be recipients of improper subsidies, 
the current state of public discussion is one of the relative degree of subsidies 
received by Boeing and Airbus (Wall & Kingsley-Jones, 2010).  As noted, Boeing 
was at some pains to pronounce itself at an unjust disadvantage in the KC-X 
competition, and Boeing’s congressional supporters introduced legislation requiring 
that the Airbus subsidies be used in evaluating the cost of the KC-30. 
                                            
2 Report published on 15 September, but distributed to only a few parties initially (Miller & Michaels, 
2010).  We have access only to press accounts available at the time of our report. 
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D. The Industrial Players 
1. Northrop Grumman (NG) 
Quite possibly reflecting a new strategy from its new CEO (Wes Bush), 
Northrop Grumman (NG) reacted negatively to the draft KC-45 Request for 
Proposal.  Bush’s mandate was reported to be profitability—especially relative to 
peer firms (major defense enterprises; Ratnam, 2010).  Both NG and its European 
Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) partner publicly disparaged the 
proposal as not providing for any significant technical improvement relative to the 
existing KC-135R (Clark, 2010).  Simply recapitalizing the KC-135 fleet would, in all 
likelihood, tilt the competition toward Boeing’s smaller, older design KC767.  In that 
context, continuing to participate in the KC-X competition arguably involved throwing 
good money after bad. 
Despite NG-EADS objections, the Air Force stuck fairly close to its original 
specifications in the Request for Proposal (RfP) published on 24 February 2010.  
Boeing supporters in Congress responded positively to the RfP (briefed to Congress 
that same day), while EADS-NG supporters were decidedly negative.  According to 
press reports, Boeing supporters such as Representative Tiahrt, a Republican from 
Kansas, praised the RfP for “rejecting the narrow interests of a foreign company,” 
while wishing to also penalize subsidies for the A330 project.  Senator Sessions, a 
Republican from Alabama, stated that “the final RfP discredits the integrity of the 
entire process” (Matthews, 2010).  
On 8 March, not long after the RfP’s publishing, Northrop Grumman 
announced it would not continue in the KC-X competition—apparently leaving the 
Boeing KC767 as the sole prospective bidder.  Being “very disappointed” with terms 
that “dramatically favor” the expected Boeing proposal, CEO Bush announced NG’s 
withdrawal (Hennigan, 2010; Northrop Grumman, 2010).  This decision left Northrop 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 11 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
At the time, it appeared that the entire NG-EADS team was dropping out of 
the competition.  As reported in the press, EADS North America’s Chairman, Ralph 
D. Crosby, Jr. stated, “As a team, our serious concerns were expressed to the 
Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force that the acquisition methodology … 
would heavily weight the competition in favor of the smaller, less capable Boeing 
tanker” (EADS-North America , 2010a; Sanders, 2010).  EADS Chairman, Louis 
Gallois, concurred, “We will not compete because the RfP is based on the smaller, 
less capable airplane.  This is giving a huge advantage to the 767” (Tran, 2010).  
Despite the criticisms and withdrawals, the Air Force reaffirmed its commitment to 
the RfP terms as stated (Reed, 2010a).  
2. European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) 
Even though EADS originally joined NG in dropping out of the KC-X 
competition, the Europeans had second thoughts rather quickly.  By early April, 
news sources reported that EADS was courting American partners for a KC-X bid, 
with L-3 receiving prominent mention.  At the same time, EADS requested a 90-day 
extension for responses to the Air Force RfP.  The Air Force agreed to a 60-day 
extension (from 10 May 10 to 9 July; Reed, 2010b; Butler, 2010a). 
Later in April, EADS publicly and confidently touted the KC-30’s strengths and 
EADS’ ability to compete without a North American partner (EADS North America, 
2010b; Reed, 2010c).  Among the advantages cited for the KC-30 proposal was a 
more mature design, already flying as part of the A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport 
(MRTT) program—which was touted as having a high degree of commonality with 
EADS’ planned KC-X proposal.  (Butler, 2010a; Michaels, 2010).  EADS also 
announced its intention to assemble tankers in the United States (Mobile, AL), as 
well as A330 freighters (Butler, 2010a; Talbot, 2010). 
As promised, EADS did submit its KC-X proposal (with 8800 pages) on 8 July 
2010.  Timing for the A330 proposal was somewhat unfortunate, given the WTO’s 
final decision finding that EADS had significantly benefited from large-scale 
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subsidies from European governments (Drew, 2010a).  Nonetheless, EADS officially 
opened its Mobile office on 12 July (Douglas, 2010). 
3. Boeing 
Boeing’s role in this latest competition has been untroubled so far—relatively 
speaking.  Although there was some speculation and reports regarding multiple 
responses to the RfP (generally including a Boeing 777 variant), Boeing settled on a 
KC-767 variant—but not the KC-767 version developed for Italy and Japan.  New 
features reported were structural enhancements, a digital cockpit (based on 787 
designs), larger wings, and a newly designed refueling boom (Butler, 2010). 
However, Boeing apparently also had second thoughts.  Boeing’s executive 
team was reported to be considering not bidding according to an anonymous 
company source.  The issues aired in public were Airbus subsidies and the fixed-
price nature of the Air Force RfP.  Regarding the subsidies, the Boeing source was 
quoted as follows:   
It gets difficult when you’re dealing with a competitor who has flat-out said on 
several occasions that they’re going to underbid us. How can they do that if 
the list price of their plane is higher than the list on our plane? Because they 
are subsidized and we’re a for-profit company, so the question we’re asking 
is: How do we compete against four governments? (Muradian & Reed, 2010, 
16 May) 
Second, there was reported to be some concern that even a winning bid 
would not be profitable: “Your heart says you have to be part of it, but a CEO’s job is 
to make sure that the heart doesn’t make a decision the head can’t live with” 
(Muradian & Reed, 2010, 16 May).  Airing the no-bid debate might well have been 
motivated by a desire to have A330 subsidies factored into the source selection 
criteria.  Indeed, legislation to that effect was introduced in Congress by Boeing 
supporters—with the sum of $5 million per airplane being mentioned (Muradian, 
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2010, 16 May).  Also, a Boeing executive spoke publicly in favor of such legislation 
(Agence France Presse [AFP], 2010a, 4 June). 
In the end, Boeing submitted a bid on the due date of 9July 2010—with a 
NewGen tanker based on its 767 aircraft (Scully, 2010, 9 July).  Boeing also 
announced it was revamping its 767 production line in order to cut costs and 
accommodate planned 787 production (Drew, 2010a, 9 July).   
4. Other Bidders 
Given the prolonged nature of the competition, and given that Airbus and 
Boeing are not really the only enterprises capable of producing large transport 
aircraft, it was inevitable (at least in retrospect) that other parties would at least 
consider joining.  However, the sequence of events that accompanied these players  
is as unusual as the rest of the KC-X story. 
United Aircraft Corporation (UAC, Russia) was reported to be interested in 
submitting a bid—as publicly announced by U.S. attorney John Kirkland.  The 
substance of the announcement was that the UAC would form a joint venture with an 
unnamed U.S. defense contractor for the purpose of offering an Il-96 (Iluyshin wide-
body transport) variant as a candidate for the KC-X.  This report quickly became a 
matter of some controversy, as the UAC denied any connection with Kirkland and 
stated that any documents purported to support Kirkland’s statements were fakes.  
(Ria Novisti, 2010, 23 March).  Regardless of the underlying facts in the matter, the 
UAC candidacy (real or not) has faded completely from the scene.3 
Late in the RfP response process, a third bidder publicly materialized in the 
form of the Antonov Aircraft—a Ukrainian enterprise partnered with U.S. Aerospace 
                                            
3 While this supports no particular conclusion, itis interesting that Kirkland’s firm website 
(luce.com) contained no mention of this incident when it was accessed in August of 2010.  Some 
particulars on John C. Kirkland, Esq., are available at Lawyers.com.  It is interesting to note that 
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(a small corporation based in California).4  The basic aircraft model proposed was 
reported as perhaps the AN-124-KC—a very large four-engine transport, or the AN-
122-KC—based on a two-engine version of the AN-124 (“AN-124,” 2010).  Also 
discussed was the AN-112-KC, a variant of the Antonov AN-12.5  Some reports 
indicated that all three aircraft would be in the final proposal (Shalal-Esa, 2010a, 2 
July).  However, the proposal submitted involved only the AN-112-KC. 
U.S. Aerospace CEO, Chuck Arnold, explained that the AN-112-KC was the 
aircraft entered into the KC-X competition—with the AN-122 and -124 variants 
intended for later tanker competitions (generally referred to as the KC-Y and KC-Z6; 
Trimble, 2010, 2 July).  The strategic cooperation agreement between U.S. 
Aerospace and Antonov was specifically limited to seeking contracts with the U.S. 
DoD, dissolving within five years if no contracts are forthcoming (AFP, 2010b, July 
2).  Basic airframe assembly would take place in the Ukraine, with final assembly in 
the United States.  According to press reports, both parties were to individually bear 
their own costs (Bennett, 2010a, 2 July).   
                                            
4 The New York Times reference resource provides the following general description of the company 
(based on SEC filings):  U.S. Aerospace, Inc., formerly New Century Companies, Inc. is engaged in 
the production of aircraft assemblies, structural components, and highly engineered, precision 
machined details for the United States Department of Defense, United States Air Force, Lockheed 
Martin Corporation, The Boeing Company, L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc., the Middle River 
Aircraft Systems subsidiary of General Electric Company, and other aircraft manufacturers, 
aerospace companies, and defense contractors. The Company supplies structural aircraft parts for 
military aircraft, such as the P-3 Orion, and wide-body commercial airliners, such as the Boeing747. 
The Company operates through its wholly owned subsidiaries, Precision Aerostructures, Inc. (PAI) 
and New Century Remanufacturing, Inc. (NCR).   
Its market capitalization as of August 10, 2010 was $3.5 million.  (New York Times, accessed 10 
August 2010) 
5 The AN-12 is roughly equivalent to the US C-130.  Both have straight wings, four turboprop engines, 
payloads of about 20 tons, and full-payload ranges around 2000 nautical miles (“AN-12,” 2010; “C-
130,” 2010).  The AN-112 was touted as a “swept-wing, jet-powered” version of the AN-12, but larger 
based on claimed wing span of 166 feet (Trimble, 2010, 2 July).  U.S. Aerospace CEO Chuck Arnold 
calls the AN-112 a AN-12 variant “not quite that, but close to that” (Trimble, 2010, 2 July).  After 
submitting the bid, the AN-112 was announced as an AN-70 variant (which resembles the A400M) 
(“AN-70,” 2010; “A-400 M,” 2010).  
6 The Air Force aerial tanker recapitalization plan includes three hypothesized models (KC-X,-Y, and 
–Z).  These are discussed, for example, in Knight (2008).  Knight, William, et. al. (28 February).  
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Nonetheless, there is no reason to believe that the AN-112-KC proposal is 
based on anything more than a proverbial paper airplane.  Moreover, there is no 
particular reason to have confidence in U.S. Aerospace’s capacity to conduct its part 
of the competition—or in its ability to attract the necessary resources (Bennett, 
2010b, July 8).  
Despite a rather hectic preparation schedule, a U.S. Aerospace-Antonov 
proposal was delivered to the Air Force on 9 July (the due date).  After some 
difficulties in delivering the documents, the proposal itself was reported to have been 
time stamped at 1405 ET—five minutes after the suspense.  As a result, the Air 
Force chose not to consider the AN-112-KC proposal.  U.S. Aerospace protested 
this decision to the Government Accountability Office (GAO; Butler, 2010c, August 
5).   
The Air Force requested expedited handling of the complaint.  On 17 
September 2010, the GAO found “insufficient support” for the allegation that the Air 
Force may have intentionally delayed the delivery of the proposal.  U.S. Aerospace 
specifically kept open the possibility of taking the case on to federal court (Shalal-
Esa & Jacobs, 2010b, 17 September).  However, it seems very likely at this writing 
that U.S. Aerospace will not pursue the matter further. 
E. Remarks 
Does anyone seriously doubt (at least in hindsight) that committing to the 
acquisition of 100 KC-767s early in the past decade would have served the national 
interest better than the current history of this sad affair?  The new tankers would 
have permitted retirement of all of the KC-135Es and a fair number of KC-135Rs.7  
Retirement of reasonably well chosen KC-135 airframes would have done much to 
                                            
7 A good first-order estimate is that the presence of 100 KC-767s would have permitted retirement of 
all the less modern E models, and about 55 R models.  This would leave about 360 KC-135Rs still to 
be recapitalized.   
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lessen the supportability problems the Air Force is now experiencing.8  The KC-767 
would have nicely filled the role of the KC-X, with a KC-Y competition between 
Boeing and Airbus proposals to follow.   
As noted above, our original interest in the KC-X competition was couched in 
terms of EADS’ corporate strategy for entering the North American defense market 
(Franck, et al., 2008a).  We then expected to study the competition between Boeing 
and EADS (with a source selection decision in early 2008).  What actually followed 
was a series of events of great interest to defense acquisition research, but which 
clearly damaged the national interest.  Boeing protested the February 2008 selection 
of the KC-30 proposal—which was sustained in June of that year.  An accelerated 
recompetition was abandoned—due, in our opinion, to election-year concerns and 
Boeing’s threat to withdraw from the competition (Franck, et al., 2008b).  In our 
2008b report, we offered the “quarrelsome committee” characterization of the U.S. 
Government in the KC-X selection process.  In our 2010 report, we offered Graham 
Allison’s Model III as having superior explanatory qualities to the well-known 
sovereign monopsonist model in standard economic theory (Franck, et al., 2010). 
What has emerged appears to be the convergence of multiple 
dysfunctionalities in the U.S. defense procurement system—which resonates with 
one of our fundamental concerns with that system; namely, that defense acquisition 
processes have become hyper-bureaucratized, hyper-legalized, and hyper-
politicized, and that these characteristics have caused a growing disconnect 
between our methods of equipping the troops and the hyper-adaptive combat 
environment in which they must operate. 
Purchasing the KC-X is motivated by the need to recapitalize the aerial 
refueling fleet using highly mature technologies.  That means that the well-worn 
explanation of technical immaturity is simply not relevant here.  Yet the process has 
                                            
8 The note just above indicates that about 30% (155/515) of the KC-135 airframes could have been 
retired.  If the least supportable airplanes were in fact retired, more than 30% of the supportability 
problems would go away. 
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dragged on—seemingly interminably.  The original lease-with-buy decision for 
Boeing KC-767s was completely derailed by discovery of ethical improprieties, which 
delayed selection for about four years (until February of 2008).  The successful 
contract award protest of 2008 has delayed the KC-X program by almost three years 
(until 2011—and perhaps longer). 
The litigation of acquisition protests (through a number of channels including 
the GAO and the federal court system) has provided yet another means of delaying 
the KC-X acquisition.  The effects of the 2008 Boeing protest speak for themselves, 
and the current U.S. Aerospace protest is still in play. 
The political system has been fully engaged—with two significant 
Congressional blocs contending over the KC-X source selection.  Not surprisingly, 
these are divided along economic geography (which states stand to gain jobs) rather 
than political parties. 
F. Wild Cards Remaining 
To our knowledge, there are at least three wild cards remaining in this 
particular deck.  If any of the events below come to pass, the KC-X selection 
process might well experience yet another significant delay. 
U.S. Aerospace protest.  The press reports of the circumstances surrounding 
the Air Force rejection of the U.S. Aerospace-Antonov proposal—which seems to 
have been 5 minutes late as a result of delays due both to U.S. Aerospace’s lack of 
familiarity with the rituals associated with submitting a major bid, and bad directions 
supplied by Air Force officials (albeit unintentionally) at Wright-Patterson AFB.   
Given the circumstances, there was a reasonable chance that the GAO would find in 
favor of the protest.  However, though the GAO opinion of 6 October 2010 went 
against the protest, there is also the possibility of the case continuing to the federal 
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courts.9  In the now unlikely event that the case goes on and the GAO ruling is 
reversed, this would probably mean yet another significant delay in the source 
selection process. 
WTO interim report on Boeing.  The WTO released its interim report 
regarding the EU complaint on September 15.  Boeing was found to have received 
improper subsidies, which leaves the interested parties free to quarrel over degrees 
of transgression.  If a sufficient number of policy makers believe (or want to believe) 
that Boeing’s subsidies were much smaller in size and much lesser in effect than 
Airbus’, there will almost certainly be renewed Congressional pressure to dictate an 
adjustment to the EADS KC-30 proposal’s price to reflect the effect of the Airbus 
subsidies.  If there is a legislative requirement to modify the selection process 
accordingly, then the competition process will have to be modified to accommodate 
this additional factor.  It appears that the subsidy effect could be readily included as 
yet another price adjustment.  (As Figure 1 above shows, the current adjustments 
involve refueling effectiveness, fuel costs, and military construction requirements.)  
However, a major revision to the selection criterion would probably entail an 
amended RfP; that is, there is yet another possibility for delay. 
Politics.  The Republicans emerged from the November 2010 elections as the 
majority party in the House, and as a significantly stronger minority in the Senate.  
Congressional power will likely shift toward members such Senator Richard Shelby, 
a Republican from Alabama—who has repeatedly and publicly impugned the 
integrity of the current source selection process as favoring Boeing (Matthews, 2010, 
24 February; Shalal-Esa, 2010c, 20 September).  While Republican Members of 
Congress can be found in both the Boeing and Airbus camps, it’s likely that the KC-
30 supporters will find a stronger voice—which might well revive the chances for a 
Congressional mandate for a dual buy.10  Because Secretary Gates has been 
                                            
9 Recent statements by U.S. Aerospace indicate this option will likely not be pursued (U.S. Aerospace 
News, 2010, October 6). 
10 As indicated in our previous reports, we would certainly not consider this a bad outcome. 
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especially careful, or sufficiently rash, to stake his reputation on a winner-take-all 
KC-X competition, there is again a real possibility of more delays in the process.  If 
the affair drags on sufficiently, there might well be a delay into 2013—motivated by a 
combination of deadlocked source selection coupled with an impending Presidential 
election just as happened in 2008.  Dunlop (2010, 3 August) discussed some 
interesting possibilities along these lines.
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=











THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 21 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
III.  C-27 and Globalization of the Aerospace 
Industry 
The C-27J Spartan is manufactured by the Alenia subsidiary of the Italian 
defense firm Finmeccanica.  The twin-turboprop multi-purpose transport aircraft is 
currently being delivered to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) through a 
partnership with the U.S. prime contractor, L-3 Communications.  Acquisition of the 
Spartan represents a return to the DoD inventory of fixed-wing, tactical aircraft in 
support of Army missions, as well as a smaller version of the Lockheed Martin (LM) 
C-130J Super Hercules.  The Spartan and Super Hercules (C-130J) share important 
features, including engines, avionics, and flight controls, which will have a favorable 
impact on support costs due to commonality (“Alenia C-27J Spartan,” 2009). 
To begin our discussion of the Spartan, we return to the Vietnam War period 
and examine the Army’s approach to the provision of tactical airlift.  We then discuss 
the Italian defense industry and the factors behind the success of the C-27J and its 
predecessor, the Fiat (later Alenia) G.222.  After discussing the details of the current 
acquisition of the C-27J by the DoD, we briefly review the purchase and modification 
of G.222s by the U.S. for eventual service in the Afghan military. 
A. Changing U.S. Army Doctrine on Tactical Airlift 
During the Vietnam War, U.S. Army doctrine on tactical mobility shifted away 
from a combination of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft toward almost exclusive 
use of helicopters.  This change was codified in the 1966 Johnson-McConnell 
agreement, which transferred Army fixed-wing assets, notably the DeHavilland C-7 
Caribou and the larger Fairchild C-123 Provider, to the United States Air Force 
(USAF).  In turn, USAF helicopter use was to be limited to Combat Search and 
Rescue as well as special operations.  Intra-theater transport of troops and 
equipment that had been traditionally performed by the Caribou could be taken on 
by Army helicopters, notably the CH-47 Chinook.  Where fixed-wing aircraft were 
required, they would be provided by the USAF (Bowers, 1983, pp. 673–674).  
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Bowers (1983) explained the effects of the Johnson-McConnell agreement as 
follows: 
The agreement was not warmly received by either service. Many Army 
officers felt that the Army had traded a real and valuable capability (the 
Caribous) for “empty guarantees of the status quo in helicopters”.  For its part, 
the Air Force was now responsible for manning and funding an aircraft that it 
had long opposed in return for renouncing rotary winged aircraft. Should 
technological progress ever favor such aircraft, then the Air Force would be in 
serious trouble.  In the short term, the agreement ushered in an era of 
“lukewarm cooperation” between the two services, and relief for the Army's 
critical pilot shortage; but the implications stretched far into the future.  Once 
the war in Vietnam ended, the Air Force soon transferred all the C-7s and C-
123s to the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. (p. 238) 
The implications of the Johnson-McConnell Agreement began to be felt after 
the attacks of September 11, 2001.  During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom, which began with the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), 
shifts began to occur in Army thinking with respect to tactical aviation, including the 
use of fixed-wing aircraft.  A significant need arose to minimize the use of vehicle 
convoys in certain areas because of the threat of attack from insurgents.  
Accordingly, “convoy replacement” missions began to be flown by USAF aircraft 
such as the C-130 Hercules and C-17A Globemaster III.   
Additionally, the effects of the intense use of helicopters for transport 
functions in hot or high environments resulted in metal fatigue, corrosion, and strains 
associated with carrying large loads through dusty and thin airspace.  The USAF did 
have one remaining small tactical transport, the Air National Guard C-23 Sherpa, but 
it was too small for the Army’s needs and was at the end of its service life.  The 
Sherpa’s lack of pressurization also precluded its use for aeromedical missions 
Squitieri, 2004).  
The Army, in particular, began to see value in having smaller fixed-wing 
aircraft available. Such aircraft could replace both heavily used and rapidly aging 
helicopters and the larger C-130s and C-17As that could best be used to carry truly 
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large loads over long distances (U.S. Army, 2008).  As explained by one Army 
report: 
Employing a light cargo airplane like the C-27J Spartan is a far more capable, 
flexible, efficient and economical solution to meeting Army intra-theater airlift 
mission requirements. The service will conduct more effective intra-theater 
airlift and save a significant amount of defense funds by acquiring and 
employing a greater number of Spartans to assume or supplement helicopter 
utility and cargo mission sets. The Spartan is the best platform to transport a 
25,000 lb payload to forward locations due to its superior performance and 
fuel range over every Army helicopter in the inventory. By evaluation of 
functional and practical lift capability with similar numbers of aircraft and 
payload weight, it is concluded that these helicopters will always be outpaced 
by the C-27J due to their slower airspeeds and shorter fuel ranges.  
The weight carrying capacity and cargo compartment dimensions of the 
Spartan make it the perfect airlifter to fill the gap between inter-theater and 
tactical airlift. The 102 flexible transloadability characteristics facilitate timely, 
efficient and effective transport while integrating with Air Force C-5, C-17 and 
C-130 cargo airplanes and Army CH-47 and UH-60 helicopters. Efficiencies 
gained by flying faster airspeeds and greater flight performance have direct 
impacts to providing improved swift mission support to the warfighter across 
extended operational distances. The C-27J is a sound acquisition decision 
because cost savings are realized upfront and over the course of the 
program. With a cost per unit of $26 million dollars each and an operating 
cost of $2,500 per flight hour, a new C-27J is approximately $6 million dollars 
less to purchase and $7,900 less to operate than a CH-47F Chinook. 
(Chaffee, 2009, pp. 101-102).  
Given the renewed need for a tactical fixed-wing transport smaller than the C-
130, the DoD initiated the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) competition, which was won by 
Finmeccanica with LM serving as U.S. prime contractor (“Alenia C-27J Spartan,” 
2009). 
B. Italy’s “Special Relationship” 
Since the end of World War II, Italy has been viewed as having a “special 
relationship” with the U.S. second only to that enjoyed by the United Kingdom.  
Approximately 13,000 active duty U.S. personnel are currently stationed at nine 
bases in Italy.  Italy participated in the Gulf War and in the current conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, which has reinforced the positive perception of U.S. defense 
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systems in Italy and the importance of interoperability between Italian and U.S. 
forces.  There is also a U.S.-Italy reciprocal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
providing for national treatment of the other nation’s firms in each other’s defense 
markets (Bialos, 2009, pp. 406–408).   
Finmeccanica, the largest Italian defense firm, and other Italian firms in the 
same market are aggressive about taking advantage of binational cooperation in 
defense products: 
Italian defense companies, for example, argue that Italy has supported 
America in Afghanistan and had more troops in Iraq than any major nation 
except Britain and the United States.  As Finmeccanica’s chief executive, Pier 
Francecsco Guarguanglini, asserted, “As allies we collaborate, but we must 
also be considered allies when it comes to accessing the U.S. market.”  The 
Italian government has aggressively supported these claims, calling for 
greater technology transfer from the United States.  The 2008 purchase of 
DRS by Finemecccanica tested the potency of Italy’s “loyal ally” strategy. 
(Neuman, 2009, p. 81) 
Italian participation in the F-35 Lightning II (also known as the Joint Strike 
Fighter, or JSF) has served to further strengthen the bilateral relationship with the 
U.S.  Final assembly and checkout (FACO) work for the F-35 will be carried out in 
Italy by Finmeccanica’s Alenia Aeronautica subsidiary.  All Italian (131 aircraft) and 
Dutch (80 aircraft) FACO will take place at Alenia’s facility near the northern Italian 
city of Carmeri (Bialos, 2009, p. 409). The importance of the FACO deal to Italy is 
explained below: 
Following a June 12 [2006] meeting with Italian air force chief Lt. Gen. 
Leonardo Tricarico, U.S. Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne says the Italians 
are “very satisfied with the return they are getting on their investment.”  
Besides the U.S. Air Force, Italy is the only other nation expected to buy 
multiple F-35 variants. Rome is interested in both the conventional takeoff-
and-landing version that will be used by USAF as well as the short-takeoff-
and-landing (Stovl) version primarily designed for the U.S. Marine Corps. 
Lockheed Martin is also developing a carrier variant for use at sea. 
The final assembly deal is another bridge between the defense industries of 
Italy and the U.S. Last year, a Lockheed Martin team was chosen over 
incumbent U.S. contractor Sikorsky to supply an AgustaWestland-designed 
helicopter to transport the president. 
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“The U.S. administration has realized that Italian products are very, very 
competitive products,” [Alenia North America President and CEO Giuseppe] 
Giordo says.  “During last year, the U.S. industry and U.S. administration 
realized that we can really contribute.” (Butler & Barrie, 2006) 
The evolution of the Italian defense industry and market has been effectively 
summarized as follows: 
The role of Finmeccanica as a “natural” partner for foreign companies willing 
to operate in the Italian market has grown recently, parallel to the process of 
internationalization and globalization of defense markets.  In light of its 
superior knowledge of the Italian environment and its direct links with the 
political and military leadership, this Italian industry leader has significant 
leverage vis-à-vis foreign firms and its own subcontractors given its size and 
dominance in the internal market. 
As a general trend, the relative degree of Italian-national content is slowly 
diminishing and the international dimension of the procurement programs is 
growing in light of customer preferences to acquire better capabilities at a 
relatively cheaper price.  This is a natural result of the increase in 
multinational programs in the last 15 years, and the pressures toward the 
European market’s overall globalization of the defense industry. (Bialos, 
2009, pp. 431–432) 
C. Italian Defense Industrial Strategy 
Since the end of the Cold War, Italian defense procurement strategy has 
shifted significantly.  Prior to 1990, the Italian government’s preference was for 
imported U.S. defense systems or licensed domestic production.  Since then, there 
has been an evolution toward a preference for higher value-added work to be 
performed in Italy, in order to grow the nation’s industrial base (Bialos, 2009, p. 399). 
The rapid growth of Finmeccanica, Italy’s largest defense supplier, has been 
a cornerstone of Italian defense industrial strategy.  Once owned entirely by the 
national government, that state holding has declined to a minority of 30%.  
Finmeccanica also has significant holdings in the United Kingdom and in the U.S. 
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The Italian government tends to hold very few open competitions, particularly 
for major programs.  There is a definite preference for sole-source procurement, with 
open competition averaging about 15% of contracts by value.  Within the other 85% 
of contracts awarded, there is an increasing trend toward multinational projects with 
both European and U.S. firms.  Intergovernmental agreements are traditionally 
handled by MOUs, rather than by more formal or binding agreements or treaties 
(Bialos, 2009, pp. 398-400). 
D. The G.222 Tactical Transport 
The C-27J’s predecessor is the Alenia G.222, which has a similar airframe. 
The G.222 remains in service with the Nigerian Air Force, the Royal Thai Air Force, 
the Argentine Army, the U.S. State Department (DOS), and the Italian Air Force—for 
electronic warfare missions (Alenia North America, 2009.   
The USAF also purchased ten G.222s, which entered service in 1990.  These 
aircraft were classified as C-27A Spartans, and used mostly by U.S. Southern 
Command in drug interdiction missions.  Following delivery from Alenia, Raytheon E-
Systems provided USAF-directed modifications to the G.222s received from Alenia, 
followed by “aircrew academic and flight training, maintenance training and complete 
logistical support” (“Raytheon E-Systems,” 2005). 
The C-27As were mostly based at the former Howard Air Force Base (AFB) in 
Panama, and had the ability to land on short strips in remote areas.  Ostensibly, due 
to high maintenance and parts costs and concurrent with the closure of Howard AFB 
mandated by the 1979 Panama Canal Treaty, the C-27As were withdrawn from 
USAF service in 1999.  Four aircraft were eventually transferred to the State 
Department, which operated them from Patrick AFB, Florida, providing 
transportation services to, from, and within Colombia (U.S. Embassy, 1999). 
E. Italian Procurement of the C-130J 
Twenty-two C-130Js were delivered to the Italian Air Force during 2000–2005 
(“Lockheed Martin 382,” 2010, February 1).  This sale included an offset 
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requirement; Lockheed Martin (LM) was required to invest in an appropriate Italian 
aerospace firm and provide a suitable degree of technology transfer as specified in 
the contract with Finmeccanica (Udis, 2009).  Given that LM is the largest U.S. 
defense contractor, Italy had much to gain from this offset package.   
Possibilities for technology transfer were related to LM’s market leadership in 
transport aircraft and avionics, as well as in many related fields.  Finmeccanica, as 
Italy’s largest defense firm and one with a strong focus on building relationships with 
U.S. industry as well as with the DoD, was a logical choice (Finnegan, 2009, pp. 95–
86).  A joint venture, Lockheed Martin Alenia Tactical Transport Systems (LMATTS), 
was established to provide the required technology transfer. 
Following the completion of the offset program, LM retreated to being a 
subcontractor to Alenia and LMATTS was wound down.  However, the LM legacy 
continues within the C-27J, making the Spartan particularly attractive to flying 
services that already operate or plan to operate the C-130J Super Hercules.  
Approximately 30% of the avionics and propulsion system (engine and engine-
related) components are common to both the Spartan and to Super Hercules, and 
the avionics system architecture is 100% common.  LM also continues to market the 
C-27J internationally (“Alenia C-27J Spartan,”2009). 
Why LM did not emerge as the C-27J U.S. prime contractor is a matter of 
speculation.  The firm had originally responded on its own to the JCA proposal with a 
shortened C-130, which was rejected by the DoD due to its excessive size (Sirak, 
2006).  In addition, given LM’s continuing strong sales of the C-130J and the 
company’s potential (and much criticized) emergence as the only U.S. fighter 
manufacturer, the firm decided that perhaps it was a better strategic choice to 
remain a lower key supplier to Finmeccanica rather than a full partner.   
The change to subcontractor status lowered LM’s political profile with respect 
to any potential European complaints of domination of both the small and heavy 
tactical airlift markets, particularly given that the Airbus A400M was also being 
developed during this period.  However, being off the political radar screen would not 
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have prevented the commonality that so many defense organizations value with 
respect to logistics, maintenance, and personnel costs. 
F. L-3 Communications: The Lead U.S. Partner 
Unlike the C-27A, the C-27J Spartan represents, according to the prime 
contractor L-3 Communications, the newest military airlifter in the world.  Its landing 
gear, engines, avionics, and structure are certified by both military (Italian Air Force) 
and civil (European Aviation Safety Agency) authorities (L-3 Communications, 
2006).  The DoD FY2011 Budget Request summarizes the C-27J program as 
follows:   
The C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is an intra-theater light cargo fixed-wing 
airlift platform that will meet the warfighter need for intra-theater airlift. The 
aircraft is a commercial derivative aircraft that meets the Army’s immediate 
requirements and provides the Air Force an additional capability in meeting 
intra-theater airlift missions. The mission to support direct delivery of Army 
time sensitive mission critical cargo was transferred from the Army to the Air 
Force. (Department of Defense [DoD], 2010) 
The C-27J’s carrying capacity is considered “unmatched in its class,” capable 
of carrying a variety of fighter jet engines as well as a High Mobility, Multiple 
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) in a cargo compartment 2.25 m high and 3.33 m wide.  
It is also a useful search and rescue aircraft, with the ability to remain on station 200 
nautical miles from its base, reaching the search area at 310 knots (Global 
Security.org, 2009).  The Spartan can cruise at a maximum altitude of 30,000 feet, 
and can take off and land fully loaded on unprepared fields or grass strips of less 
than 2,000 feet (“Alenia C-27J Spartan,” 2009). 
In addition to the USAF purchase, C-27Js have been acquired at the time of 
writing by the flying services of Bulgaria (3 aircraft), Greece (12 aircraft), Italy (5 
aircraft), Lithuania (2 aircraft), Morocco (4 aircraft), and Romania (7 aircraft; “Alenia 
C-27J Spartan,” 2009).  Taiwan may also purchase six aircraft and there is the 
possibility of a sale to Slovakia (“Procurement,” 2010a).  Australia finally withdrew its 
De Havilland Canada DHC-4s (C-7 Caribou equivalents) during 2009, because of 
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severe parts shortages and the piston-powered aircraft’s need for aviation gasoline.  
The Royal Australian Air Force anticipates obtaining government approval to buy ten 
C-27Js in 2012–2013 (“Procurement,” 2010b).   
Prospects for a sale to the Canadian Forces (CF) are uncertain.  In 2005, the 
CF selected the C-27J for the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR) mission 
along Canada’s west coast.  Because of the rugged topography, aircraft such as the 
C-130 Hercules are not suitable for the FWSAR mission.  Lacking any other suitable 
aircraft, Canada continues to use the aging (1973) De Havilland Canada DHC-5 
Buffalo aircraft in this role. The DHC-5s (known as CC-115s in the CF) are a 
subsequent development of the C-7 Caribou.  The U.S. Army, seeking an upgraded 
aircraft, purchased four Buffaloes in the early 1960s, with the designation C-8A.  
Once transferred to the USAF under the Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966, 
they were quickly disposed of. 
Between 2005 and 2008, Canada procured the C-17A Globemaster III, CH-
47D11 and CH-47F Chinooks, and C-130J Super Hercules using sole-source 
contracts.  These acquisitions have drawn complaints from the domestic aerospace 
industry, which complained of insufficient “quality work” being generated by the 
100% open-ended offset requirement associated with the sole-source buys.  When a 
Canadian firm acquired the plans of the DHC-5 Buffalo and proposed to update and 
manufacture the aircraft in Canada, the government placed the matter of FWSAR 
“under review.”   
The CF leadership has remained clear on its preference for the C-27J based 
on operational requirements.  Commonality is another significant military concern, 
                                            
11 The CF removed its CH-47C Chinooks from service in 1992.  In 2008, the need for the Chinook’s 
capabilities in Afghanistan became such that six U.S. Army CH-47Ds were left behind in Afghanistan 
during 2008, and transferred in situ to the Canadian Forces.  One has since crashed.  This measure 
was undertaken pending delivery of sixteen CH-47Fs from Boeing, to begin in 2011 (Jane’s, 2010, 
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given that future C-27J operators Australia and the U.S. are, along with the UK, 
Canada’s closest allies.  Finmeccanica has also promised a $3 billion industrial 
benefits package to Canada.  However, Canada would be the only nation 
purchasing the Spartan solely for search and rescue.  The political dénouement of 
the Canadian acquisition may be lengthy, particularly as the government tries to 
restrain spending in a time of recession (Canadian Forces, 2010; Chase, 2009). 
G. Impact of the FY2010 Defense Budget 
The U.S. Administration’s FY2010 budget request reduced the quantity of C-
27Js to be purchased by the DoD from 78 to 38.  Certain consequences have 
resulted from the reduction in quantity.  First, the remaining 38 aircraft will be 
operated solely by the USAF, as tactical support for Army missions, in particular in 
intra-theater airlift.  Second, the USAF Special Operations Command mission for the 
C-27J was eliminated.   
Third, program management for the C-27J, formerly a joint USAF-Army 
responsibility, now rests entirely with the USAF.  Which service’s pilots will fly the 
Spartan has yet to be determined.  The DoD has designated the Spartan as a “direct 
mission support aircraft” while the USAF views it informally as a “mini-C-130 
Hercules” (Diamond, 2009; DoD, 2010).  Alenia has also stated that the Spartan was 
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Because of the reduction, Alenia may drop plans to assemble the Spartans 
ordered by the DoD at Cecil Field in Jacksonville, Florida.  The following report 
indicates that Finmeccanica does not see the cut in the Spartan buy as a major 
obstacle to its long-term plans to expand its U.S. operations: 
Finmeccanica CEO Pierfrancesco Guarguaglini marshaled 15 of his top 
defense executives at a meeting with investors in New York on May 19 [2009] 
to help back his claim that DRS [a major U.S. defense electronics contractor], 
acquired last year, will see orders climb in the next three years and find solid 
synergies with its Italian owner.  “The updating of existing products and 
maintenance to make U.S. Army equipment efficient, as requested by U.S. 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates, can be guaranteed by our DRS unit,” he 
said. 
On the downside, a spokesman at Finmeccanica unit Alenia Aeronautica said 
that if the Pentagon sticks to its recently announced decision to buy 38, not 
the planned 78, of its C-27J tactical transport aircraft, Alenia could scrap its 
planned final assembly line in Florida and dispatch them instead from its plant 
in Turin.  The Florida plant made sense when the U.S. Army and Air Force 
wanted an initial order of 78 and had a Defense Department-approved 
requirement of 145 Joint Cargo Aircraft, the spokesman said.  “If this buy is 
prematurely terminated or capped at 38, then we will have to re-examine our 
business case to determine if the need versus the anticipated cost still 
remains,” he said. (Kington, 2009) 
The USAF has also announced that all C-27Js will be assigned to the Air 
National Guard (Trimble, 2009; Buzanowski, 2009).  The Army study mentioned 
above took issue with even the original number of aircraft to be assigned to airlift 
duties:  “Acquiring, integrating, and operating a larger number of C-27J Spartan 
cargo airplanes to assume or supplement existing utility and cargo helicopter 
missions is a more capable, flexible, efficient and economical solution to meeting 
Army intra-theater airlift mission requirements” (Chaffee, 2009, p. 9). 
The small initial quantity of Spartans may be viewed with skepticism with 
respect to the aircraft’s long-term survival within the USAF fleet.  However, the 
practical need to better utilize over-committed and aging helicopters, and similarly 
overstretched C-130 and C-17A fleets, should logically lead to significant follow-on 
orders for the C-27J.  
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As the Army and USAF rediscover the advantages of small airlifters, and 
helicopter fleets are able to refocus on VTOL and combat operations, the C-27 
appears to have a reasonably secure future within the USAF inventory.  One 
emerging factor is the development of unmanned aircraft for troop resupply and 
related missions.  Boeing, LM, and Kaman Aerospace have demonstrated 
unmanned helicopters capable of forward resupply (Warwick, 2010a). 
H. The Afghan National Army Air Corps C-27/G.222 
As part of U.S. defense security cooperation with the nascent Afghan National 
Army, the U.S. has contracted with Alenia North America to acquire and modernize 
18 G.222 aircraft (Alenia North America, 2009).  These aircraft have been 
designated C-27/G.222 and will be donated to Afghanistan, after which the fleet will 
become part of the Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC).  The USAF is also 
providing English-language instruction and specialty training to pilots, loadmasters, 
and maintenance personnel at U.S. installations prior to follow-on C-27/G.222 
training in Afghanistan (“USAF Receives,” 2009).  The program has been described 
as follows: 
Thirty experienced ANAAC fixed-wing pilots moved to the US in May for 
English-language training and instrument flight training. They are due to 
return to Afghanistan for C-27 transition training, which will be conducted by 
USAF instructor pilots. In the meantime, Afghan aircraft maintainers who are 
also undergoing a training programme will work alongside contractor support 
personnel.  
All 18 G.222s are former Italian Air Force aircraft that Alenia Aeronautica 
bought back at the time of the Italian C-27J purchase. The aircraft were built 
between 1977 and 1985 to different production standards and kept at open-
air bases in Pisa and Pratica di Mare after being dismissed from the service 
because of corrosion problems.  
Alenia Aeronautica's Capodichino facility will repair and refurnish the 
airframes and provide them with an additional service life of at least 10,000 
flying hours, replacing all the onboard systems affected by obsolescence 
problems. As the aircraft have different production standards, the avionics 
and systems are being replaced or upgraded and standardised to a common 
configuration, including an updated cockpit, a new autopilot and navigation 
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system with colour map display and GPS [Global Positioning System] 
receiver, as well as ballistic protection. (Peruzzi, 2009) 
The success of the ANAAC C-27/C.222 program will depend in the longer 
term on Afghanistan’s ability to field and maintain an air force.  The project is 
interesting from a number of viewpoints: the aircraft will have some commonality 
with Italian, U.S. and other allied aircraft, promoting interoperability and security 
cooperation, and U.S. funding for the upgrade has been used to further relations 
with Finmeccanica and Italy. 
I. From Italian Offsets to U.S. Aircraft Commonality 
The C-27J Spartan represents an example of an offset program that has 
produced significant benefits for the U.S., Italy, and the nations who will be using the 
aircraft.  What began as a way to support the Italian aerospace industry in 
compensation for that nation’s purchase of the C-130J Hercules became an 
essentially new airlifter that has been purchased by several countries as well as the 
U.S. and Italy.  International sales prospects are strong given the aging fleets of 
similar aircraft in the flying services and government departments of many countries.  
Commonality, both within the C-27J worldwide fleet and between this aircraft and the 
C-130J Super Hercules, is a further bonus.  As nations place increasing emphasis 
on minimizing operating costs and exploiting commonality with other countries for 
training, logistics, and operations, the C-27J has a bright future. 
At the same time, if the Spartan is seen from the U.S. perspective as a 
“descendent of the Caribou” or a “mini-Herc,” its worldwide deployment is taking 
place during the early stages of development of unmanned cargo aircraft.  The C-
27J has additional potential roles such as airdrop, refueling, troop transport, and 
patrol/reconnaissance.  The last of these is already firmly in the unmanned domain 
for those countries that have chosen that route.  
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There will always be a role for fixed-wing manned aircraft, particularly given 
the pessimistic outlook for replacement of the aging transport helicopters maintained 
by the U.S. and her allies.  The tactical, high-performance, short-field role of the 
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IV. The Rise of Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(UASs or UAVs) 
Like most new and good ideas, the new generation of Unmanned Air Vehicles 
(UAVs) have been significantly oversold during the period of initial enthusiasm.  We 
think one such overreach is asserting that unmanned systems are the centerpiece of 
a new Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  While the rise of unmanned combat 
systems is certainly important, it does not rate the appellation “RMA,” at least not 
yet.  A better view, we believe, is that unmanned military systems are (a) a 
continuation of the US-led RMA, and (b) a set of offsetting counters to the counter 
RMA (led by Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and similar organizations).  Additionally, they 
have considerable potential to be “game-changing” innovations in defense industrial 
affairs. 
As stated in our previous reports (esp., Franck, et al., 2008a), we believe 
there are two RMAs now ongoing.  The U.S. RMA emerged from a number of 
initiatives which date back at least as far as the Vietnam War.  One of the precursor 
conflicts in this RMA was the highly successful Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.  
A relatively mature demonstration occurred in the operations of the U.S. 
Reconnaissance-Strike Complex (RUK12) employed in the Gulf War of 199113  
(Franck & Hildebrandt, 1996).  Since then, the U.S. and its allies, have made 
significant efforts to advance this RMA.14   
                                            
12 “RUK” is an acronym for a Russian term—which translates as “Reconnaissance-Strike Complex.” 
13 This was, we believe, a point in the progression of this RMA roughly comparable to the German 
invasion of Poland in 1939 within the Interwar RMA.   




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 36 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
A. Unmanned Systems in Context: The Enthusiasts’ Story, 
and Why It’s Not True 
According to the enthusiasts (such as Robert Finkelstein), UAVs and other 
robotic devices have spent decades being kept on the sidelines stupidly 
(maliciously?) by a cabal of pilots, whose white-scarf mentality includes an ill-
considered prejudice against unmanned systems (Singer, 2009, pp. 53–55).  It isn’t 
so. 
The early experiments produced very useful extensions of the state of the art.  
They also revealed serious limitations.  For example, the original UAV experiments 
included reconnaissance aircraft, which flew preplanned tracks with data recovery 
after completion of the mission.  This approach involved at least two problems.  First, 
the vehicle’s navigational accuracy was limited to then-existing equipment—e.g., 
inertial navigation.  Second, data retrieval was generally done after completion of the 
mission.  This, by necessity, delayed the cycle of processing, interpretation, and 
(most importantly) taking action based on the intelligence gathered.  Finding a useful 
target without taking action before it moves (i.e., inside its “dwell time”) has only 
limited operational value.  These unmanned systems were, not yet cost-effective 
substitutes for a trained human crew on the scene.  This was especially true in the 
emerging lethal, fast-paced combat environment—as shown in the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War. 
These earlier experiments and concept demonstrations also revealed 
important difficulties.  These included very high accident rates, high cost, and 
technical immaturity (Hirschberg, 2009, pp. 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11).  Perhaps most 
important, the panoply of UAVs—especially its high-altitude, long-endurance 
component—is dependent upon air supremacy – a dicey proposition at best when 
opposing the air forces of the Warsaw Pact.  In short, because of their technical 
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Accordingly, the U.S. Air Force, for example, sensibly chose to use its 
decidedly limited post-Vietnam resources to secure air superiority against large and 
capable Warsaw Pact air forces (with F-15s, and F-16s); to contribute to victory in a 
large-scale Air-Land Battle against the Soviets (F-16s and A-10s); and to enhance 
power projection and deep strike capabilities by improving tanker and transport 
forces (KC-10s, KC-135Rs, C-5Bs and C-17s).  In the end, what made UAVs 
candidates for serious combat roles was the same cluster of technical advances that 
made possible the rest of the U.S.-led RMA.  In particular, communication and data 
transfer capabilities—enhanced by space assets—made unmanned systems much 
more effective.  The Global Positioning System (GPS) greatly increased navigational 
accuracy.  Broad-band, long-range satellite-enabled communications enabled faster 
data recovery.  Furthermore, those new communications capabilities enabled remote 
(sometimes very remote) control of unmanned systems, which meant that 
unmanned systems could adapt quickly to changes in the operational environment.15 
Finally, conflicts of the early 21st Century created something of a hothouse 
environment that enabled the growth and flourishing of unmanned systems.  Air 
superiority was quickly established and easily maintained in both Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Being able to take air superiority for granted quite literally opened the skies for 
UAVs.  Moreover, both conflicts rather quickly changed to operations against 
terrorists and insurgents.  And, as discussed below,, UAVs capabilities provided 
useful counters to the insurgents’ methods.  
                                            
15 This was an advantage whose value was nicely captured by John Boyd’s concept of OODA loops, 
and their implications.  Unfortunately, Boyd didn’t systematically put his thoughts to writing (although 
some of his briefings are available on the internet).  Nonetheless, there’s a hagiographic body of 
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1. Unmanned Combat Systems in Contemporary Military Affairs 
Fundamentally, Reconnaissance-Strike Complexes (the primary 
manifestation of the U.S.-led RMA) perform traditional tasks associated with high-
intensity conventional combat with great speed and lethality: detecting targets of 
interest, tracking them, allocating forces to strike them, engaging the targets, and 
assessing the results of the engagements.  Because of cheap and plentiful IT 
applications—such as computers, sensors, and precision guidance—all of those 
tasks are performed with unprecedented speed and effectiveness.  The results were 
amply demonstrated in U.S.-led operations against Iraq in 1991 and 2003.16 
The second RMA is usefully understood as a counter to the first.  This 
revolution is led by insurgent and terrorist organizations throughout the world—
following strategic scripts patterned on those traditionally used by terrorists and 
insurgents—and as codified by theorist-practitioners such as Mao Tse-Tung (Mao, 
1960).  The true believers in the U.S. RMA proclaimed the coming end of 
Clausewitzian fog and friction in warfare (e.g., Hazlett, 1995).  The terrorist-insurgent 
RMA was intended to (a) reintroduce fog and friction with a vengeance, and (b) 
extend the theater of operations to public perceptions.  And, as a bypassing 
response to the U.S. RMA,17 those were well suited to exploiting the vulnerabilities of 
liberal democracies: strategic impatience, bureaucratic slowness, and the operations 
of a free press (Franck & Pierce, 2006).   
Exploiting the possibilities of cheap and plentiful IT applications, the insurgent 
and terrorist movements have proven highly adaptable, flexible, and opportunistic.  
                                            
16 This example is true only if we confine the 2003 operations to the march on Baghdad, and not the 
insurgency that followed. 
17 “Bypassing” responses, if successful, make the opponent’s mode of operation either obsolete or 
irrelevant.  For example, the U.S.-led RMA made obsolete armed forces modeled on the Interwar 
RMA (which introduced mechanized air-land combat).  The intent of the terrorist-insurgent RMA was 
(in effect) countering the U.S.-led RMA by making Reconnaissance-Strike Complexes irrelevant.  
Among other things, this involves denying information about insurgent forces by blending in with the 
general population—emerging from cover only to pursue active operations.  For a discussion of 
“emulating,” “offsetting,” and “bypassing” responses, see Franck and Hildebrandt (1996).  For a more 
specific discussion of the terrorist-insurgent RMA, see Franck and Pierce (2006). 
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One of the manifestations of these characteristics has been the ability to switch 
modes of military operation quickly, labeled as “hybrid war” by Western 
commentators—including officials at the U.S. DoD.18 
What these two RMAs have in common is being enabled by modern 
Information Technology (IT).  The U.S. RMA is enabled by a large set of IT 
applications (Franck & Hildebrandt, 1996).  It performs traditional military tasks in 
conventional combat with very high speed and lethality.  The new insurgent 
movements have made good use of IT methods—especially the internet, to publicize 
their cause,19 coordinate operations, conduct training, and spread the word regarding 
best practices.   
The contest between these two military systems (formerly called the Global 
War on Terror) continues.  Within that framework, the emergence of unmanned 
military systems (including UAVs) is an offsetting counter to the ongoing terrorist-
insurgent RMA.  Among other things, unmanned systems have been very helpful 
(but not the only factor) in increasing the U.S. and allied forces’ ability to maintain 
extensive (ideally continuous and pervasive) surveillance of the relevant 
“battlespace.”  The operational effect is to disrupt the insurgents’ preferred tactical 
mode of emerging from cover within the population to conduct military operations, 
and then fading back into cover.  For example, there are many documented 
incidents of insurgents being continuously tracked from aerial assets (manned or 
unmanned) which permits rolling up not only the operational forces—but also the 
support infrastructure (e.g., safe houses; Seifert, 2007).20  Within the Franck-
                                            
18 However, Mao’s three stages model of insurgent warfare included the possibility that guerrilla 
forces could switch from one stage to the next (and revert back) based on the current situation and 
correlation of forces (Mao, 1960).  
19 An intercepted letter from al-Zawahiri (Al Qaeda) to Al-Zarqawi (Al Qaeda Iraq) reads as follows: 
“more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media” (ODNI, 2005, p. 10 of the 
letter’s text). 
20 It is worth noting that the article cited in the text above is about using manned systems (gunships) 
as disruptive counters to insurgent-terrorist operations.  However, the AC-130 featured in the article 
had to leave the areas of operations for aerial refueling.  UAVs can stay on-scene longer. 
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Hildebrandt (1996) classification scheme, UAVs are part of a large-scale disruptive 
offsetting response to the insurgents and terrorists. 
Additionally, unmanned systems have been extensively employed to counter 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).  UAVs provide aerial surveillance and 
detection of likely IED sites.  Also, unmanned land systems have been used to 
disarm those IEDs.  Thus, unmanned systems have also been defensive offsetting 
counters to the ongoing insurgent RMA. 
2. Unmanned Systems in Contemporary Defense Industrial Affairs  
a. Ahead to the Past 
Clearly the most interesting (but perhaps not the most important) effect on 
defense industries has been the return of relatively small firms as prime 
contractors—General Atomics (Predator UAV) being one of many good examples.  
Since unmanned airframes are relatively cheap and simple compared to their 
manned counterparts, firms other than giants such as Boeing and Lockheed-Martin 
can take the lead on developing and producing these platforms.  Also, given the 
relatively low cost and simplicity, firms can finance development projects with their 
own funds.  For example, the B-17 Flying Fortress was developed in the 1930s with 
Boeing Company funds (with upwards of 12,000 eventually produced).  One of the 
last ventures along these lines was the Northrop F-20 (nee FX and then F-5G), 
which was pursued with company funds from 1975 to 1986, and then cancelled with 
costs in excess of $1 billion dollars and no airplanes sold (Northrop F-20, 2010). 
With UAVs being an integral part of all Services’ inventories, defense 
industrial affairs have, in some sense, returned to the 1930s, when the size and risk 
of the project did not dwarf the size of the firm.  Thus, for example, Northrop 
Grumman is currently continuing a UAV project (Killer Bee) despite no offers from 
the U.S. DoD, but with the hope of international sales (Butler, 2010c). 
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b. The Great Escapes, Maybe 
The newly achieved effectiveness of UAVs has offered some relief from major 
problems currently plaguing the U.S. defense industrial system.  These include the 
cumbersome nature of the defense acquisition process, and the seemingly 
inexorable (and rapid) rise in the cost of manned aircraft systems.  
One of the fundamental disconnects between the DoD acquisition system and 
the real world of military affairs is the increasingly adaptive nature of modern 
warfare—with rapid changes in modes of operation—contrasted with the time-
consuming and delay-prone DoD acquisition process.  (The KC-X is one of the many 
projects whose results speak for themselves.)  Given that UAV development projects 
are relatively cheap; they can be financed within firms, or can be undertaken within 
the DoD as special projects—outside the usual system of extensive oversight.  Also, 
many UAV projects have been taken to production and operational capability much 
more quickly than their manned aircraft.  The new equipment must then be 
integrated into the day-to-day operations and support structure of the military.   
Even with its faults, the DoD acquisition system nonetheless integrates new 
equipment types into the Services’ logistics and support systems.  For the UAVs 
developed more-or-less on the fly, this integration has been more problematic—as 
the case of the Army’s Raven UAV illustrates below. 
Another disconnect is the long-term rise in the price of manned aircraft 
systems—especially manned fighters.  One characterization of this trend was 
offered by aerospace executive Norman Augustine as one of “Augustine’s Laws” of 
defense acquisition.  Given the rate of growth of tactical fighter cost growth relative 
to U.S. GDP and extrapolating those trends into the indefinite future, one of 
Augustine’s Laws predicted that the entire defense budget would support purchases 
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of tactical fighter aircraft around 2054 (Augustine, 1987, pp. 139–147).21  A quarter 
century later, Augustine claims we’re “right on target” to reach that state  (“The Cost 
of Weapons,” 2010).22  One way out of this difficulty is to rely on unmanned systems, 
which are smaller in scale and less expensive to develop and purchase.23   
Sections IV.B. and IV.C. below are complementary inquiries into UAVs and 
their effects on the global defense market.  IV.B. covers UAVs in general, but 
focuses primarily on larger unmanned systems (generally operated by the U.S. Air 
Force).  IV.C. is about one interesting small UAV—the Army’s Raven.  It details the 
methods used in its development, production, and employment.  An especially 
interesting feature is what it took to integrate the Raven into the Army’s logistical and 
support systems 
B. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
1. Background 
Though this section is about the development and employment of unmanned 
systems by the U.S. military, it should be regarded as the first stage of a larger 
investigation of the subject.  Though unmanned systems have been utilized for 
ground and maritime environment operations as well, this report will focus largely on 
unmanned aerial systems (or vehicles).  According to a recent article,  
The Air Force, not surprisingly, possesses the most sophisticated inventory 
and has made the greatest  investment in unmanned aircraft, with nearly 66 
percent of all service RPA (remotely piloted aircraft) spending coming from Air 
Force accounts over the past decades.  (Bowie & Isherwood, 2010; OSD, 
2010) 
                                            
21 This is, in fact, Augustine’s most famous law, number XVI.  It is interesting to note that other laws, 
such as XIV (p. 124)—which predicted that electronics would constitute the entirety of aircraft 
systems’ weight in 2015, and will almost certainly be proven false, have received much less publicity. 
22 The article cited includes charts which plot that trend. 
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The broadest definition of unmanned aerial vehicles or systems describes 
them as “an aircraft that flies without a human crew on board the aircraft.”  Unlike 
missiles, they are “reusable” and are “capable of controlled, sustained , level flight 
and powered by a jet or reciprocating engine.”   Unlike missiles, while unmanned 
and often remotely guided, the vehicle itself is not a weapon (OSD, Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles, 2010). 
UAVs exist in a wide range of sizes, shapes, and capabilities.24  While 
originally remotely piloted drones, they are increasingly controlled autonomously, 
either from a remote location or by a pre-programmed flight plan based on complex 
dynamic systems.  Though traditionally used primarily for intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance missions, they are now more often “weaponized” for use in an 
attack mode.25  
It has been estimated that during the first half of the 20th century, the 
Department of Defense spent something in the vicinity of $25 billion on various 
unmanned aircraft programs without ever having developed “an effective, 
operational air system” (Bowie & Isherwood, 2010).   During this fifty year period, 
several cycles of usage and expenditures on unmanned aerial systems can be 
identified, growing during periods of war or crisis and diminishing sharply in 
peacetime.   
                                                                                                                                       
23 Some skeptics question whether unmanned systems are cheaper to operate.  These are detailed in 
the discussion below. 
24 The sizes range from as big as a large commercial airplane down to mini or even nano size.   The 
large ones can fly very high and remain on station for days or even months.  The small ones can fit 
into a pocket and approximate insect size with some able to operate within a building and perch on 
vertical walls and roofs  (U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2011, pp. 2-7 and 3-1 to to 3-12). 
25 A useful distinction between the terms “reconnaissance” and “surveillance”, often employed 
erroneously as synonymous, focuses on the element of time.  Thus, reconnaissance implies a brief 
view of a target, often requiring additional interpretation in order to fully comprehend what has been 
observed.  On the other hand, surveillance yields a more complete understanding of the target area 
usually obtained by extensive loitering (see Ehrhard, 2010, n. 62, 93). 
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Thus, during the 1960s, the Navy installed large numbers of QH-50 DASH 
torpedo-launching helicopter drones on U.S. destroyers as an emergency measure 
to meet a threat coming from a growing number of Soviet attack submarines, only to 
replace that entire fleet when larger destroyers became available capable of 
accommodating manned helicopters armed with more accurate and powerful 
torpedoes (“History of Unmanned,” 2010).  During the air war over Vietnam, UAVs 
played an important role and “at the zenith of drone operations in December 1972, 
the Air Force depended almost entirely on them for bomb damage assessment due 
to bad weather”26 (Erhard, 2010, p. 2).  In the mid-1990s, the Air Force was 
employing Predators over Bosnia and Kosovo during the conflict resulting from the 
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia (Erhard, 2010, p. 3). 
These successes were recognized in a Defense Science Board report in early 
2004.  The cover letter of transmission observed that  
There is no longer any question of the technical viability and operational utility 
of UAVs.  The success of UAVs in recent conflicts represents a historic 
opportunity to exploit the transformational capabilities inherent in 
UAVs/UCAVs (Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles).  Indeed, these recent 
combat operations appear to indicate that unmanned air systems have at last 
come of age. (Defense Science Board, 2004)   
The words “at last” are worthy of attention.  Why, after all, did it take half a century 
for their promise to be recognized and developed? 
A painstakingly detailed explanation has been provided by Ehrhard (2010).  
No brief summary of his work can do it justice, but his history is divided between 
technological and organizational factors.  The first are easier to understand and 
basically focus on levels of technological maturity in UAVs which, at critical times, 
lagged behind that found in competitive systems such as guided missiles, satellites, 
                                            
26 During the Vietnam War, UAVs such as the Firebee were also used to monitor trail networks and to 
locate surface-to-air missile sites.  See Isherwood (2010, p. 58).  Even earlier, uses were found for 
UAVs such as training antiaircraft crews for the Army and Navy before World War II, and flying 
unmanned Air Force B-17 aircraft to collect radioactive samples after tests of atomic bombs in 1947 
and 1948 (Isherwood, 2010, p. 58).    
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and very high flying reconnaissance aircraft such as the U-2.  It has taken time for 
the present levels of technical sophistication to be achieved.  On the other hand, the 
organizational factors may be more difficult to correct.  Likewise, there were the 
inconvenient truths of technical maturity, operational capability, and the nature of 
combat threats during the Cold War. 
Over the earlier years of its history, financial and other support provided by 
non-military service branches such as the intelligence community via the National 
Reconnaissance Office and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency were 
critical but when it was withdrawn, no home was offered to the new “orphan” in the 
armed services.  No support community had been developed and, over the years, 
UAVs became a political football in inter- and even intra-Service rivalries.  In 
addition, Ehrhard (2010, p. 56) believes that attempts at centralized management of 
UAVs via civilian authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense failed to 
recognize and deal with the forces of political and operational reality. 
The following quotation well describes Ehrhard’s view on military acquisition 
of new systems. “Structurally, the centralized management construct, atomized an 
already sparse UAV constituency.  Essentially, DARO (Defense Airborne 
Reconnaissance Office) ‘outsourced’ UAVs , stripping whatever internal service 
advocacy existed and making integration that much more difficult” (Ehrhard, 2010, p. 
33). 
The 1990s reinforced an immutable truth concerning weapon system 
innovation in the United States.  The Services, as end-users, require substantial 
autonomy at each stage of the weapon system innovation process.  Although 
external advocates and agencies undoubtedly play an important role in weapon 
system development and adoption, the symbiosis between the Service and the 
machine required for combat innovation depends on the mobilization of an internal 
constituency.  The weapon system must be able to function in the Service’s peculiar 
environment, which implies not only unique air vehicle designs but also extensive, 
often expensive militarization.  The service members must also adapt themselves to 
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the machine, but typically the machine (through design, technology integration, and 
militarization) has to reach some minimum level of congruence before the Service 
will begin to move. 
Having said that, there remains little doubt that the Services, like all 
organizations, will not change without an external catalyst.  However, it is the nature 
of the catalyst that matters.  Policies that stimulate internal, organic adjustments in a 
Service and allow control over the  machine’s design can encourage the man-
machine symbiosis and enable innovation.  The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance 
Office (DARO) saga showed that external containment of the prime implementers 
disassociates the Services, dampens internal change processes, and ultimately 
hinders weapon system innovation.   
In the final analysis, the vanguard of the UAV proletariat proved no more, and 
arguably less, capable of UAV development than the Services.  They did so in the 
most positive external environment encountered in the study.  Weapon system 
innovation by containing the Services and constricting funding ignored reality—it 
requires energetic service participation, weapon system differentiation and 
militarization, and the realization on all sides that UAVs are not cheap in dollars or 
manpower.  The ultimate goal of weapon system innovation is its novel, effective use 
in combat, and as a byproduct, its enduring integration into a Service’s force 
structure.  Centralized UAV management as practiced by DARO inhibited that 
process by putting UAVs in direct conflict with manned reconnaissance systems by 
further diffusing internal structures in the Army and Navy, and by pushing UAVs into 
an idealized box into which they could not fit from a design, utility, or cost 
perspective.  The meteoric rise and fall of centralized UAV management provided 
strong evidence that “pluralism and untidiness” indeed may be the only way for the 
U.S. military to achieve weapon system innovation with the UAV (Erhard, 2010, p. 
57). 
The analysis by Bowie and Isherwood (2010) identifies “a confluence of 
technical and operational factors which finally pushed RPAs to the forefront” (p. 1).   
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They attempt to explain the fact that by the year 2008, more than 500,000 flying 
hours were logged by the U.S. armed forces, an incredible sixteen times gain over 
2002.  Their principal points follow below. 
A major shortcoming in the utilization of UAVs (or RPAs, Remotely Piloted 
Vehicles) was found in their navigational limitations.  In the 1960s, such vehicles as 
the Tagboard and the Compass Dwell/Cope systems often displayed “meandering” 
flight paths which sharply limited their usefulness.  This deficiency has been largely 
corrected by the use of Global Positioning Systems based on satellite constellations 
which accurately identify not only the position of the UAV itself but also that of the 
precise area targeted by its sensors.  This development was a precondition to the 
weaponizing of UAVs. 
Vast improvement in computational capabilities and in advanced software 
since the late 1960s have expanded the tasks that these vehicles are capable of 
handling reliably and the accompanying miniaturization of computers allowed for 
their installation and operation on smaller vehicles.  Predators and Reapers can now 
assume a hold position or return to base if their communications links to controllers 
are disrupted.   
The operating range of UAVs has been expanded by satellite 
communications and associated bandwidth which permits them to be employed 
beyond the horizon compared to their prior limitations imposed by the necessity for 
them to remain in line of sight from the ground station.  Sensor output data are also 
now transmitted via satellite communication. 
Removing a human pilot from the cockpit has the obvious advantage of 
reducing the number of military personnel in harm’s way.  However, very important 
military advantages also flow from such a development, because pilot duty time 
limits the potential length of a mission or sortie.  In small, fighter-sized aircraft with 
limited cockpit space, the typical pilot duty day has been estimated at 12 hours.  
However, that does not mean 12 hours over the target because three hours are 
typically devoted to mission preparation and debriefing after the mission.  Moreover, 
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travel time from base to target and return can absorb the bulk of the remaining 9 
hours.  This has been particularly true for U-2 missions over Afghanistan which 
originated at a U.S. base.  The comparison of manned with unmanned missions is 
impressive.  Bowie and Isherwood (2010, p. 5) estimate that to maintain a 24-hour 
orbit over a target 1,150 miles from base with a Global Hawk requires one sortie; 
performing the same mission with U-2 aircraft would require five sorties, with 
approximately 50% of the flying time spent in transit.  Each of those sorties would 
require a different aircraft and pilot with associated ground crew, equipment, and 
supplies. 
Until recently, data monitored from wide-area surveillance sensors still 
required further interpretation and analysis before it could be directly useful to 
combat commanders and their troops.  Predators and Reapers with Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) sensors and full-motion video cameras 
mounted on their airframes changed all this, allowing military personnel to observe 
what is happening in the target area, even when it is beyond their line of vision.  
When these capabilities are merged with ground attack weapons, the UAV has the 
capacity to attack the target in almost real-time. 
On occasion, when an immediate attack is not possible due to the risk of 
collateral damage or other considerations, tracking the target requires the capacity 
for persistence which is increasingly available.  Reducing the sensor-to-shooter time 
to minutes from hours or days, as was previously the case, has proven particularly 
useful in the pursuit of terrorists in Afghanistan and neighboring regions (Erhard, 
2010, p. 5). 
2. Continuing Problems 
An important point has been raised recently which reveals serious limitations 
to UAVs’ operational utility—their vulnerability to hostile air defense systems.  The 
bulk of UAV successes have taken place in environments in which U.S. forces 
enjoyed almost total control of the air.  This air supremacy has enabled them to 
operate with very little concern about their vulnerability to hostile surface-to-air 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 49 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
challenges.   If they were to operate against hostile forces with sophisticated air 
defense measures, their design, which often omits defensive capabilities, and their 
limited maneuverability could become serious matters of concern.  To correct this 
condition is technically possible but would surely not be cheap.  UAVs capable of 
operating at high altitudes, say between 60,000 and 70,000 feet might be less 
vulnerable to enemy surface-to-air missiles, but most UAVs currently in use are not 
capable of operating at such elevations. 
Another source of concern focuses on the growing efforts of hostile forces to 
electronically jam UAV connections to GPS systems and otherwise interfere with 
their control mechanisms.  Such tactics would be particularly effective against 
smaller UAVs with limited ceiling capabilities.  
From the viewpoint of the producers, a somewhat different problem exists, 
which involves figuring out how unmanned systems fit into the future strategic vision 
of the U.S. armed forces.  UAVs attained their current high level of visibility and 
demand in the midst of what appeared to be atypical combat situations—asymmetric 
attacks from non-state actors.  The difficult but important question facing UAV 
producers is whether this form of warfare will be viewed as the wave of the future, 
superseding more traditional threats from legacy foe states.  At the macro level, the 
DoD’s view of the future strategic environment faced by the U.S. can be found in 
official documents such as the periodic National Security Strategy issued by the 
Office of the President (the most recent of which is dated May 2010) and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report issued by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (the most recent of which is dated February 2010).   
Drawing on such documents, Michael Isherwood (2008, p. 58) has identified 
four challenges, all of which must be ever present in strategic planning:  traditional 
challenges, from countries utilizing modern armed forces in a theatre conflict;  
irregular challenges, which may originate from a variety of foes ranging from 
international terrorist organizations like al Qaeda to widespread insurgencies;  
catastrophic challenges involving the acquisition and possible use of weapons of 
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mass destruction  which may come from either sovereign states or non-state actors;   
and disruptive challenges by an adversary using revolutionary technology or doctrine 
to checkmate U.S. military superiority.   The relevant point here is Isherwood’s 
judgment that countering all or any of these challenges  will require that military 
commanders obtain “persistent awareness” which he defines as “the sustained 
ability to monitor or surveil a wide area while concurrently obtaining detailed, 
precision target quality information on targets, forces or similar points of interest” 
(Isherwood, 2008, pp. 3–4).  Given the unique ability of unmanned systems to 
provide such persistent awareness, their future need would appear secure. 
A more micro approach to ascertaining their future role would be to examine a 
variety of real world cases in which they have already demonstrated or logically 
fulfilled a complementary role with traditional manned weapon systems.  One 
example occurred in 1999.  UAVs flew low over Kosovo as spotters, identifying 
targets to be attacked by manned aircraft operating above 15,000 feet to reduce the 
danger from enemy surface-to-air missiles (Mahadevan, 2010, p. 2).   
Other hypothetical uses are receiving serious consideration.  For example, 
the Navy has been examining the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) to help protect 
expensive fifth generation aircraft from increasingly capable antiaircraft defenses.  
The Navy program manager for Airborne Electronic Attack and the EA-6B Prowler 
has commented that “one of the reasons that the chief of naval operations aligned 
UAVs and electronic countermeasures is because he sees it as all part of 
information dominance” (Fulghum, 2010b, August 9, p. 48).  In a companion article, 
the same official suggested that a long-term solution might be found in the combined 
use of stealthy and non-stealthy and manned and unmanned aircraft in support of 
one another in standoff jamming27 (Fulghum, 2010b, August 9, pp. 46–47). 
                                            
27  According to Fulghum (2010b), sophisticated antiaircraft missile threats will endanger even 
stealthy designs. (p. 47). 
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Even more exotic missions have been imagined for UAVs.  Thus, the Reaper 
(Predator B) and Avenger (Predator C) especially, have been suggested to carry 
interceptors designed to destroy tactical ballistic missiles directly after launch 
(Fulgham, 2010c, September 20, p. 72). 
Air Force leadership has cautioned against assuming that the future will bring 
only irregular warfare.  One anonymous respondent interpreted this concern as 
follows:   
The battle will be to balance the way the military wants to fight in Afghanistan 
now against how it wants to fight elsewhere in the future.  Air Force officials 
want to keep those two needs from becoming widely divergent points in 
geography, technology and operational techniques. 
They see combat in Afghanistan as possibly having direct benefits for 
conventional wars, and given the important role played by UAVs in this conflict, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that their capabilities would be found useful in more 
conventional warfare (Fulghum & Sweetman, 2009, pp. 26–27). 
In an interesting look at developments in the UAV field, David Voss (senior 
director of control technologies at Rockwell Collins) and John Langford (president of 
UAV developer Aurora Flight Sciences) expressed the belief that manned aviation 
will ultimately benefit from advances in unmanned.  According to Voss, “It is a 
strategic thrust [at Rockwell Collins] to take unmanned into manned.”  He provided 
an example of Rockwell’s work for DARPA on damage—tolerant autonomous flight 
controls, which could be used to improve the safety of manned aircraft (Warwick, 
2010b, June 8, p. 51). 
The very successes of UAVs in Iraq and Afghanistan have introduced a 
significant problem.   UAV flight hours in that theatre of operations more than tripled 
between 2006 and 2009 and yet ground commanders complain that only a third of 
their requests are being met due to shortages of aircraft and pilots (Zucchino, 2010).  
Mass production requires standardization, and even if the production facilities were 
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available, the great variety of UAVs in action would make such an increase in 
production difficult to achieve.   
A more immediate problem is the shortage of trained operators and the fact 
that at present, the ratio of UAVs to operators in a mission is 1:1.  Efforts are 
underway to enable operators to control multiple drones and more than one type 
simultaneously because the need is serious.  Press accounts indicate that Army 
engineers are installing devices in such helicopters as the Apache and the Chinook 
to allow their pilots to communicate with and, perhaps control UAVs.  In addition, 
Boeing has developed its “advanced tactical network system” which allows pilots 
and ground crews to simultaneously watch video feeds.  The system permits instant 
messaging and has a GPS tracker to pinpoint locations on a map (Wright, 2010, 
July, pp. 26–27).   
The rushed circumstances surrounding the critical need for UAVs in the 
Iraq/Afghanistan conflict explains, in part, the absence of a uniform approach to 
unmanned aircraft in the Defense Department in the post 9/11 period.  After 
examining acquisition programs for eight UAVs and two payload development 
programs, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that most 
programs “experienced cost increases, schedule delays, performance shortfalls, or 
some combination of these problems” (GAO, 2009, July, p. 2).  The report identified 
service-driven requirements and funding processes and ineffective collaboration as 
key factors which limited the attainment of commonality and made recommendations 
to correct the problem.  It attributed much of the cost growth to “changes in program 
requirements and system designs after initiating development” (GAO, 2009, July, p. 
7).   This behavior is too familiar to be attributed entirely to the circumstances 
surrounding this conflict, and suggests an underlying problem in the weapons 
acquisition process. 
An effort to address at least part of the cost consequences of duplication in 
UAV operations motivated a memorandum of agreement signed on June 12, 2010 
by the chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Navy and Air Force.  Its goal was to achieve 
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operational and financial efficiencies in the Air Force Global Hawk and Navy Broad 
Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) programs.  The two systems are to be 
collocated at several bases and a single pilot and maintenance training program is 
being established for both fleets (Butler, 2010b, p. 27).28  
Another troublesome problem in the operation of UAVs has been their limited 
sense-and-avoid capabilities, which are necessary to reduce the likelihood of mid-air 
collisions.  This is not a major factor in the skies over Afghanistan, but it is a 
potential nightmare over densely populated areas.  As UAV exercises and training 
become more widespread in the U.S., this problem will demand attention.  A first 
step has been taken through an Army proposal for the FAA to grant the Army 
permission to fly unmanned aircraft in national airspace at night using ground-based 
radar and GPS systems to avoid civilian and commercial traffic (Jean, 2010).  
3. Interview Responses 
During the late spring and summer of 2010, interviews were conducted with 
anonymous respondents from seven UAV producing firms, six headquartered in the 
U.S. and one abroad.  One additional U.S. firm was approached but declined to 
participate in the study.  The participants were guaranteed confidentiality and non-
attribution, thus responses will be presented by topic area, rather than by company.  
In the event that company name or product line is mentioned in published material 
that is already in the public domain, we will feel no obligation to refrain from using 
that quotation if it appears relevant to the topic under discussion.  The cooperating 
firms were AAI Corporation, AeroVironment, Boeing, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), 
L-3, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman. 
                                            
28 Another example of a movement from the unmanned to a manned version is found in the 
advertisement by General Atomics of its Griffin Eye – Manned All-Weather ISR (Defense News, 16 
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4. Industrial Structure 
Since the end of the Cold War the number of major prime defense contractors 
in the U.S. has declined sharply with the current number of firms meeting that 
definition now numbering three—Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman.  
Interestingly, the situation in the unmanned systems industry is quite the reverse, 
with the number of competitors, depending on definition, registering in the dozens.29  
In part, this growth reflects such factors as relative ease of entry resulting from low 
capital requirements, modest patent barriers, and a sudden explosive increase in 
demand for the product.  Such an environment encouraged the appearance of the 
mythical bright persons operating in a garage.  Indeed, the defense industry 
experienced something of a turmoil which, in turn, resulted in a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions by the major contractors   
Such factors resulted in significant changes on both the supply and demand 
sides of the market which our interviews were designed to examine in the hope that 
the information unearthed might lead to a better understanding of likely future 
developments in the industry. 
5. Cost Considerations 
Several of our respondents cautioned against accepting the Hollywood vision 
of unmanned vehicles which tends to focus on the absence of a human pilot and the 
expectation that somehow, robotics provide a path to a cheaper product capable of 
previously undreamed of capabilities.  A more realistic picture was painted by Air 
Force General Roger A. Brady at a July 2010 conference at which he emphasized 
that “There is nothing unmanned about an unmanned aerial system.”  The crucial 
word in this statement is “system.”  He went on to note that  
                                            
29 Indicative of this growing community is the fact that over 6,000 persons registered to attend the 
August 2010 Denver meetings of the Association of Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, the 
industry trade association. 
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the support tail for an unmanned system can meet and exceed that of a 
piloted plane.  The ratio of crew members to UAS can approach 10 to 
one…while fighter jets require two crew members at most and usually just 
one pilot. …Manpower costs are ultimately more challenging for restricted 
defense budgets than the systems they operate. (Beidel, 2010, pp. 28–31)  
This point was further expanded by a respondent who noted that removing 
the man from the cockpit does not change, and may even increase, the size of the 
footprint on the ground of the support crew that provides maintenance, logistical, and 
weapons support.  He added that comparing the cost of an F-16 fighter with a 
comparable sized UAV does not yield a wide difference because both must be 
equipped with similar engine, payload, and sensors and that the cost consequences 
of removing the pilot would be small—essentially removing the ejection seat.  
A recent study made the point that “For a large strike aircraft required to carry 
sizable internal weapons payloads, the dimensions of its platform are driven by the 
dimensions of its weapons bay. …Removing the cockpit would not significantly 
change the aircraft’s platform.”  While conceding that “Their freedom from the 
limitations of a human pilot makes the UASs the platform of choice for very long-
duration missions” the author counters that “Maintaining a “man-in-the-loop for 
hundreds of unmanned aircraft operating simultaneously in future air campaigns 
would require a complex infrastructure of secure C2 links and huge bandwidth 
capacity.”  He cautions that “Unfortunately, providing true autonomy for complex 
unmanned systems that must operate in dynamic high-threat combat environments 
is beyond today’s state-of-the-art technologies” (Gunzinger, 2010, pp. 40–42).  
When the mission is essentially ISR, and the manned equivalent is a high 
flying U-2 type aircraft, the UAV would seem to have an advantage.  As noted 
above, limitations of range and loitering ability would require multiple U-2 sorties to 
acquire what a single UAV with a 24 hour loitering capacity could obtain.   This 
advantage would also be reflected in a reduction in the manned aircraft’s fatigue life 
cycle, which builds up especially during aircraft takeoffs and landings which would 
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be reduced with the reduced number of sorties.  One of our respondents added 
another possible source of savings resulting from reduced training costs associated 
with reduced missions.  He noted that in peacetime, two thirds of flying hours are 
devoted to training. 
6. Reception of the UAV Concept by the Military 
The UAV history during the post-9/11 period is a classic case of responding to 
active opponents resulting in new modes of operation.  Thus, the need for devices to 
ease the lot of U.S. ground forces—especially in urban combat environments—was 
important and recognized by combat commanders and industrial organizations.  
Individuals on both sides recognized that there was hardly time to follow standard 
procedures and have the defense establishment prepare carefully drafted Requests 
for Proposals.  Unsolicited proposals were received and acted upon.   
Fortunately, the Air Force had an organization designed to handle such a 
circumstance, the Big Safari program office.  It is responsible for sustainment and 
modification of special mission aircraft and weapons systems and has been 
described by the Air Force as a “rapid procurement force” (“Big Safari,” 2010).   It 
provided an imprimatur of legitimacy for acquisitions which had not emerged from 
the standard RFP procedure.  Almost without exception, our respondents considered 
this arrangement favorably.  In the words of one, “It took visionary engineers at the 
laboratory and majors in the field to make the product useful and get it to the troops.  
Dedicated people were busy saving lives and, in the process, cut many corners in 
the standard acquisition process.”  Another respondent noted that “The whole UAV 
community is now making up rules as we go along.   We needed and found risk 
takers in the program office.”  
Another respondent emphasized that the process by which requirements are 
determined could be improved upon.  He noted that his firm had imbedded field 
service representatives with the troops and established chat rooms in the field to 
allow users to confer with the company engineers to learn how the product could be 
improved.  His firm was able to gain the cooperation of other competitors in devising 
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a way to significantly reduce the weight of a device designed to be carried in the 
backpacks of troops. This approach enabled the people in the field to influence 
those writing specifications in the Pentagon.  The underlying philosophy is that UAVs 
represent a novel technology which is not old enough to devise a useful cookbook of 
answers to problems likely to be encountered in the field. 
There seemed to be general agreement and understanding of the fact that all 
the armed Services have their own traditions and procedures which are difficult to 
change.  One respondent commented that there was no shortage of legacy 
engineering talent at NAVAIR, but questioned the necessity to apply the same level 
of scrutiny of work on UAVs that was required for fighter aircraft.  He gave the 
example of a requirement for redundant mechanical fasteners when, in his opinion, 
aerospace adhesives would be adequate.  He summarized his position by 
comparing the requirements applied to UAVs to those that would have been used for 
B-2 bombers.  In other words, nothing short of a 100% solution was acceptable.  The 
Air Force did not escape similar criticism, and another respondent observed that the 
Air Force was skeptical of any idea that had not originated within the Service, an 
unwelcome attitude in a time of crisis. 
A spokesman for one of the major prime contractors made the interesting 
point that “If you wait for the RfP you lose it”, which emphasized that the contractors 
play a role in turning the thinking of the Services in directions “outside of the box”, so 
to speak.  Another respondent from a major producer gave credit to smaller firms for 
having “practically reinvented the airplane”.  He confirmed the fact that UAVs were 
handled outside the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) acquisition process, which 
provided a means to the rapid fielding of the product. 
However, this same individual drew a distinction between relatively short-lived 
UAVs and very large projects yielding products that were expected to remain in 
service for decades, such as nuclear submarines, aerial refueling tankers, and the 
like.  In such cases, rapid fielding is not usually possible, and the development of 
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such products might well require very high quality standards and other safeguards 
provided within the mainstream of the standard acquisition process.  
The frustration within the command structure in dealing with UAVs was well 
expressed by the comments of Air Force General Roger A. Brady, already quoted 
above:  “It [the UAV] does not meet my definition of a weapons system.  If I see an 
F-16, that’s a weapons system.  You know where it is, you know where all the 
electrons are going, you know what’s happening, you know who’s responsible.  
There’s a program manager you can call and yell at.  There are operators. There’s a 
command chain” (Beidel, 2010, pp. 28–31). 
This is a practical recognition of the necessity to accelerate the introduction of 
UAVs into the force structure, which, incidentally, was the first and most important 
(their words) recommendation made by the Defense Science Board (2004) in its 
report cited above (in the Executive Summary, p. v). 
A sympathetic view of the military’s response to the way UAVs have been 
introduced was presented by a respondent with extensive experience as a naval 
pilot.  In his words: “The military has been ‘burned’ by numerous smallish 
manufacturers of UAS products.  Because they grew out of the Remote Control 
airplane community which has no milspec standards, reliability has been a problem 
with most of these efforts, and the military has migrated to established companies 
with more of an aircraft production legacy.”30 
This same individual presented interesting written comments on a number of 
these topics. 
Question: Has the adoption of UAVs been resisted by the Services that, 
perhaps, see them as competitors for missions, status, personnel and funds?    
                                            
30 This same point is emphasized in a recent British Joint Doctrine Note (op cit., pp. 3-10, 5-6 and 5-
7) which observed that as UAVs become larger and more complex the issue of their airworthiness 
becomes a more important factor in decisions by MOD puchasing authorities.  It was noted that such 
authorities might be more likely to concentrate their contracts in the hands of more traditional aircraft 
producers for whom airworthiness has long been an essential ingredient of product acceptability. 
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Answer: Answers vary by Service.  In general the USAF has been first to 
realize the benefits of UAS integration.  The ISR role was acknowledged early 
on, and they have transitioned large portions of their airborne assets to UAS.  
[In] the next ten years, that will get even more aggressive (see USAF “Flight 
Plan”).  Second to embrace is the Army, which has more UASs now than any 
other service.  They’re struggling a bit with manning/equipping and 
establishment of a “UAS Community” but are making progress.  Third is 
USMC, fourth is USN.  Much reluctance to integrate at sea, which is a much 
more complex environment. 
Question: Are UASs seen as replacements for, or complements to, manned 
systems?   
Answer: Answer is complicated.  Right now, primary role across the board for 
UASs is ISR, and they are seen as both complements to existing force 
structure (they can maintain a presence which manned aircraft simply cannot 
do),  but they are also taking the place of manned ISR assets  (USAF U-2, 
USN P-3/S-3).  Outside the realm of ISR (strike platforms), they are not 
replacing manned assets as quickly as some would like.  There are serious 
training, joint fires, coordination, and airspace issues when evolving into more 
advanced mission sets (i.e., it’s relatively easy to get pictures/video, it’s a lot 
more complicated to start delivering weapons.   [A point might be interjected 
here to call attention to the high level of complementarity demonstrated by 
Israeli UAVs and strike aircraft in the conflict over Lebanon in 1981.]  
Question: Are UASs seen as equally useful in dealing with legacy foes as 
with challenges from asymmetric, non-state actors?   
Answer: In a word, yes.  They have reached the point where, from a strict 
capability perspective, UASs can physically do approximately 60-70% of the 
missions which manned aircraft can do.  Again, the issues become primarily 
training of the operators.  There will always be some missions where the 
situational awareness resident in the cockpit cannot be transferred to a 
console (i.e., air to air dogfighting, dynamic close air support or dynamic 
search and rescue).31 
                                            
31 The issue of operator recruitment and training is one of growing importance.  The size and 
complexity of the   UAV suggests that no single formula for operator training will be optimal for all 
cases. The U.S. Air Force presently requires that its UAV operators be fully   rated pilots who work in 
flight suits and receive flight pay.  Such a rule might make sense for those controlling large and 
complex vehicles engaged in air combat and other missions where a significant level of airmanship 
could be essential.  On the other hand, such a requirement would seem excessive for a soldier or 
marine operating a hand launched, relatively simple vehicle.  
Relevant to this point is the comment of an Army Raven Equipping Detachment officer in Kuwait: 
 "The Raven is not MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) specific.  One of the best pilots in the 1st 
Cav is a cook...The soldiers are trained...at the training base in Kuwait with a two week program of 
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A comment by another respondent supplements the last answer above.  If 
UAVs were used against more capable legacy foes, survivability problems would 
have to be addressed -- which will doubtless make them heavier and more costly.  
Under such circumstances, requirements creep and gold plating will almost inevitably 
appear. 
7. Defense Industrial Base Considerations  
In this section, we present a series of questions and the set of written 
answers offered by the respondent referred to above.   Then, these answers will be 
supplemented with observations on the same subject presented in private 
conversations with the other respondents.  
Question: Can changing trends be identified in UAS usage with possible 
impacts on the defense industrial base?   
Answer: Yes.  As we migrate to more missions for UASs (beyond ISR), there 
will be a shift required to weaponization and increased situational awareness 
at the UAS operator console.  The UAS Command, Communications and 
Control architecture will become more important than the actual air vehicles. 
Question: Are there significant differences between the experience of free 
standing UAS firms and UAS divisions of large multiproduct firms?   
Answer: In a word, no.  Most of the larger companies without UAS 
manufacturing capability have formed Teaming Arrangements with smaller 
                                                                                                                                       
instruction.  We've trained 44 different MOSs...from Apache pilots to cooks." (Jenkins and Snodgrass, 
2005, p. 36 
Such an opportunity for an enlisted soldier might well be considered an upgrade in responsibility, 
perhaps rewarded by promotion to warrant officer rank. However, given the ethos of fighter pilots, 
such a transfer of a pilot to operate UAVs from a trailer truck somewhere far from the fight might not 
appear an attractive opportunity.  Under present circumstances of operator shortage, temporary 
transfer of pilots from other aircraft has been the typical path taken by the Air Force.  If this pattern 
continues but such an assignment becomes a necessary requirement for an Air Force officer's career 
promotion, it might be seen as an acceptable stint.  
However, such a temporary assignment would appear to run counter to a recent statement by the Air 
Force Chief of Staff expressing a need for a career path for UAV professionals equivalent to their 
rated counterparts (IISS, Weber, 2011). 
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firms who do.  As previously discussed, the “cottage industry” folks have been 
marginalized to some extent due to the importance of milspec/milstandards. 
Question:  Are there ways to integrate previously independent and innovative 
firms into larger organizations without stifling their creative capabilities?   
Answer: Yes and no.  There are ways to do it, and many have been 
successful (Boeing/Insitu, L-3/Geneva Aerospace, Northrop Grumman/Scaled 
Composites).  What typically happens is the overhead of the larger 
companies drives costs way up. 
This answer is supplemented by other responses obtained in the interviews.  
A top executive of a company absorbed into a larger multiproduct firm considers the 
transaction successfully conducted.  He noted that top management recognizes that 
the small company perspective developed in the absorbed firm added much to its 
success.  Hence, it would be foolish to change that, and endanger the creativity 
which motivated the absorption in the first place.   Another consideration was 
focused on the history and nature of the absorbing firm, which for most of its 
existence operated principally in civilian markets where considerations of cost and 
customer awareness were important.   
The degree of control exercised over the acquired firm may also reflect the 
philosophy and structure of the acquiring firm.  An executive of one firm focused 
attention on this point, noting that if the acquirer was controlled by venture capitalists 
rather than by an entrenched industry management, the bottom line, or economic 
success of the operation would be uppermost, rather than the inner details of the 
organization’s bureaucracy.  
Another respondent from a firm with experience in such organizational 
change conceded that experience suggests the likelihood that small creative firms 
bought by larger multiproduct companies will find it difficult to retain their creativity.  
To do so would require that they successfully resist the strong tendency for the 
bureaucracy of the larger organization to take control and force corporation-wide 
consistency in the application of its rules and policies.  Decision makers in the larger 
firm have the difficult choice of weighing the possible synergistic benefits found in 
corporate integration against the risk that doing so will stifle the creativity that 
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originally motivated the acquisition.   Top management must tailor its policies to 
secure the objectives behind the acquisition.   If creativity is uppermost, then the 
required policy will be to leave the new unit essentially alone.  This may require 
allowing it to operate in its own premises and to take serious steps to discourage 
visits from officials of the acquiring firm, especially from such bureaucratic 
departments as human relations, accounting, etc.  In other words, the absorbing firm 
should attempt to maintain the fiction that nothing has changed except for the new 
availability of more capital and advice when desired. 
One respondent admitted that such an operation would be difficult to carry out 
successfully, and, interestingly, doubted that the chances were good that such 
independence, even if attained, could be sustained over the long run.  He appeared 
to believe that, however gradually, integration into the mainstream of the company 
was probably inevitable.  A suggestion that Lockheed’s famous “Skunk Works” might 
be an example to the contrary was rejected by another participant on the grounds 
that its history has been limited, largely, to work in the “black world” and that it has 
never been an incubator of new ideas that migrated into the company at large. 
Question: Is there a future for the smaller, independent firm in dealing with 
the DoD or are obstacles such as mastering the intricacies of procurement 
regulations an insurmountable hurdle?   
Answer: My experience the last ten years is no.  The smaller companies 
need the backing of the larger scale firms to adequately compete (teaming 
agreements/partnering/etc.).  Go it alone and you’re under-resourced in the 
“FEDBIZOPS.”32  
Another respondent suggested that it wasn’t necessarily the size of the 
acquiring organization but the presence or absence of the risk takers.  At some 
point, he felt that people in any organization have to learn how far they can go, or 
what the “thou shalt nots” are.  He emphasized that companies differ in their cultures 
and how they respond to failure.  He felt a critical question was whether you were 
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“shot for failure” or,  whether you operated in an environment in which decision 
makers believed that “nothing succeeds like failure” in the learning process. 
Question: How important are UAS divisions within larger multiproduct firms in 
terms of sales, revenue, and/or other measures of performance?   
Answer: It’s all related to the business case in each opportunity.  Those who 
can compete for large scale DoD business with superior products (success 
breeds success) can justify a larger portion of the company’s business 
development budget. 
Question: How important are foreign firms in UAS supply chains or as 
customers, and have U.S. export control and technology transfer regulations 
constituted significant obstacles?    
Answer: The foreign UAS market is expanding but is still a distant second to 
the DoD.  The Israelis have the lead on numerous fronts but the US is starting 
to make inroads.  Export licensing has not been a huge problem for tactical 
class UAS and below, but the Medium Alt Long Endurance (MALE) market is 
”handicapped” by CMTR (Cruise Missile Treaty Regs regulations prohibiting 
the sale of longer range UASs  to non-signatories of the CMT). 
Another respondent described the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) 
as “the bane of our existence”, and complained that the interpretation of the rules by 
the State Department’s Bureau of Political and Military Affairs has been inconsistent. 
An industry veteran made some general comments about dealing with the 
government which may be applicable to the topic of export controls as well.  He 
noted that today’s environment is the most risk intolerant he had seen in his 30 
years in the industry.   His impression was that the present system appears 
designed “not to succeed, but rather, not to fail”.  The bottom line was that risk taking 
is being discouraged.   
The issue of export controls has attracted the attention of top industry 
executives.  At the July 2010 Farnborough air show, Wes Bush, CEO of Northrop 
                                                                                                                                       
32 A US General Services Operation web site which serves as the “single government point-of-entry 
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Grumman, noted that U.S. export controls could harm the nation’s advantage in 
unmanned aircraft technologies by encouraging foreign competitors to develop their 
own systems.  In his words, “We need to realize exactly what it is we’re trying to 
protect.  There are a lot of folks around the world that understand how to build really 
good airframes.  And a UAV is basically an airframe” (Anselmo, 2010). 
8. Remarks 
Academics and scholars have concerned themselves with the question of 
whether UASs are transformational and represent a revolution in Military Affairs.  
One such treatment described a transformational change as one which “convey[s] 
an asymmetric and possibly decisive advantage to the side that possesses” [such 
devices or technology].  The author contrasts such a revolutionary change with an 
evolutionary change, which can be countered by matching innovations (Mahadevan, 
2010).   He considers drones as belonging to the latter category. 
Other commentators’ opinions may differ with this categorization.  Historically, 
a number of innovations with important military applications can be identified:  the 
replacement of sails with steam engines on naval vessels; the introduction of the 
tank during World War I; the development of manned aircraft following the 
appearance of balloons; and the development of nuclear power and of space 
satellites.  Whatever they were labeled, the military was obliged to apply them to 
military purposes, and the development of UASs was no exception.33 
                                            
33 It is of interest to note that after a long and rather unsuccessful history of attempts to reform the 
cold-war vintage collection of U.S. arms transfer regulations, a fresh attempt appears to show 
promise of adoption. In April 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced a new Administration 
plan for sweeping reforms aimed at the establishment of a single control list, administered by a single 
agency for licensing and enforcement, using a single information technology.  
The plan was the product of a widespread interagency review of the current system directed by the 
President in the summer of 2009.  In an August 2009 statement, he commented that "we need 
fundamental reform in all four areas of our current system in what we control, how we control it, how 
we enforce those controls, and how we manage our controls."*  If successfully implementd which will 
require both Executive and Congressional action, many of the problems resulting from the 
implementation of current regulations may be significantly alleviated (The White House, 9 December 
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Since no nation has a monopoly on creativity, time becomes an important element in 
the process of development, and it must always deal with the human preference to 
stay with the familiar.  Thus, the role of the person with foresight and the capacity to 
take risk remains highly important.  In this context, one may watch the influence of a 
recent product of the Naval War College which recommends a virtual restructuring of 
the U.S. Navy around the concept of Unmanned Systems (Chief of Naval Operations 
Strategic Studies Group [CNO SSG], 2009). 
9. A Small Unmanned Aerial System: Raven 
The U.S. Army made its first efforts to develop a relatively small battlefield 
Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) in the early 1980’s.  That program was named 
Aquila and was sponsored by the Field Artillery community as a new target 
acquisition capability.  The program was not successful due to many reasons, not 
the least of which was “requirements creep.”  Users, as the program evolved through 
early developmental stages, wanted increasing sensor capabilities that exceeded 
the original design payload.  Attempts to “scale-up” the original design to 
accommodate the increased weight were not successful and the program suffered 
many test failures.   
The inaugural Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) Field Artillery Functional Area 
Assessment (FAA) in 1984 sealed the Aquila’s fate.  General Maxwell Thurmond, 
after taking the Aquila’s Assessment Briefing, determined that the technology 
required to meet the Field Artillery requirements was insufficiently mature and 
ordered the program terminated.  Army RPV efforts went back into the Technical 
Base and Exploratory Development Research communities.   
From that beginning, Army and DoD RPV programs evolved into Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle (UAV) programs that developed larger and more capable air vehicles that 
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eventually grew into Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs).  The category of 
UAV was recently renamed Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs).34 
This section will focus on a case study from the smallest end of the UAS 
spectrum: the RQ-11 “Raven,” a hand-launched small UAS, hereafter referred to by 
its popular name: Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (SUAV).  Mawn and Tokumaru 
(2005) page 1 summarized the Raven’s early history:   
The SUAV capability was identified during the [Military Operations in Urban 
Terrain, Advanced Capability Technology Demonstration] MOUT ACTD 
(FY98-02). This program focused on identifying technology solutions in 33 
requirement areas for dismounted forces fighting in urban terrain.  The 
Pointer SUAV, an AeroVironment, Inc. product, was provided as a technology 
solution for meeting the requirement for an organic intelligence-gathering tool.  
Initial warfighter experimentation with the system provided positive feedback 
and identified some shortfalls which were addressed by the program before 
the culminating demonstration.  These included addition of an infrared (IR) 
camera for night operations, shrinking the ground control unit to a man-
portable size, integration of the military P(y)-code global positioning system 
(GPS), and receipt of approvals from the Army spectrum manager for military 
use. 
Experimentation data and soldier feedback gathered throughout the MOUT 
ACTD clearly demonstrated enhanced warfighter performance and resulted in user 
acceptance during experimentation.  During the program’s culminating 
                                            
34 Another development is worthy of attention, that of the public perception of UAVs.  Speaking at an 
April conference on UAVs (IISS, April 2011), Lieutenant General David A, Deptula, USAF (Ret.) and 
General Michael V. Hayden, USAF (Ret.) both cautioned against widespread misinterpretations of 
how UAVs work.  Critics often assume that because there is no pilot aboard the vehicle, it can be 
viewed as an armed robot capable of taking over from the control of human beings.  This overlooks 
the fact that there is a significant human footprint on the ground to control the aerial vehicle.  Another 
component of the argument of the critics is that the very fact that UAVs remove the traditional pilot 
from harm’s way serves to dehumanize combat and, thus, makes war more likely.  Much use has 
been made of the famous comment of Robert E. Lee after the Battle of Fredericksberg in 1862: “It is 
well that war is so terrible, else we would grow too fond of it.”  The logic is clear:  if war is less 
horrible, it is more likely.  Another line of attack is that war is not less horrible and that “collateral 
damage” is substantial.  A typical statement reads that “The evidence shows that the hyperbole 
surrounding UAVs and their vaunted precision is sheer fantasy, if not literally science fiction.”   Sluka, 
2010) Such a view would appear to be written in complete ignorance of the civilian casualties of WWII 
from carpet bombings of Germany, firebombings of Japan (not to mention losses from the nuclear 
attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) and the V-bombs used to attack London in the last year of that 
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demonstration in September of 2000, 28 technologies satisfying a variety of 
requirements were utilized.  The Pointer SUAV was ranked third among those, thus 
validating the military utility of the SUAV capability. 
Technology successes during the MOUT ACTD resulted in funding for an 
experimentation extension during the extended user evaluation period of the MOUT 
ACTD (FY01–02).  During this period, limited funding allowed the team to pursue 
further development of technologies that had demonstrated military utility.  The 
Pointer SUAV had been a clear success, but had also exhibited shortcomings which 
could not be addressed in time for MOUT ACTD’s culminating event, chief among 
them were its size and weight.  The MOUT ACTD funded AeroVironment in April 
2001 to explore the feasibility of a platform with the same capability at half the size 
and weight.  The Flashlite SUAV resulted.  A subsequent Phase II contract award 
yielded the first RAVEN SUAV. 
The program that became the Raven had initially received interest and some 
funding from the Special Operations Command (SOCOM).  SOCOM wanted a small, 
man-portable and hand-launched aerial system that could carry sensors to extend 
the “vision” of small unit commanders beyond line-of-sight in order to gather 
intelligence concerning enemy dispositions.  Major Aerospace Corporations were 
generally not interested in developing such a low-cost, unsophisticated system.  
However, a few small businesses with some aircraft and electronics capabilities 
were interested.  One such company, AeroVironment of Simi Valley, CA, was 
selected to support the ACTD.  The promise demonstrated in the MOUT ACTD led 
to further funding (Pathfinder ACTD-FY02–06) and a defacto “partnership” evolved 
between U.S. Army Natick Labs on the Government side and AeroVironment on the 
contractor side to develop an increasingly sophisticated small unit Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) system.  
10. The Pathfinder Raven System 
The Pathfinder Raven SUAV, hereafter referred to as just Raven, is 
essentially a semi-autonomous small aircraft that is powered by a battery-driven 
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electric motor.  The use of a reliable and maintainable electric motor facilitates a 
relatively low noise signature to enable Raven to be difficult for the enemy to detect.  
It is controlled from a man-portable custom ground station that also receives sensor 
data for real-time battlefield use at small unit (company-sized and smaller) level.  
The Raven carries either a day (electro-optical) or a night (infrared) sensor.  
Mawn and Tokumaru (2005) page 2 described the system:  
The air vehicle weighs 4 lbs, with a wingspan of 4.5 ft, and is capable of 80-
minute flights using rechargeable batteries or 100-minute flights with one-time 
use lithium batteries.  The air vehicle is capable of a nominal operating range 
of 10 km under manual, semi-autonomous, or full autonomous operations, 
and incorporates military GPS for navigation.  The Pathfinder Raven SUAV 
requires no special equipment during launch and recovery.  The system is 
hand-launched by a standing operator and recovered in a deep stall 
configuration allowing for operation in small complex terrains.  The aircraft 
speed range is 20 to 70 mph. 
The air vehicle is designed for rough use and is modular in construction in 
order to be easily portable as well as repairable using minimal tools.  It is carried 
disassembled in a ruggedized and waterproof soft pack.  Modules, including the 
wings and tail, are virtually “snapped together.”  This modular design also permits 
rapid replacement of damaged parts; the air vehicle was literally designed to be 
crashed. 
Mawn and Tokumaru (2005), page 1, continued:  
The Pathfinder Raven SUAV is primarily a reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
target acquisition system.  The SUV provides the small unit with enhanced 
situational awareness and increased force protection, by providing the means 
for expanded reconnaissance/surveillance, coverage of marginal maneuver 
areas, as well as increased target acquisition capability and an ability to 
reduce exposure in high-risk situations.  The system has proven itself to be a 
critical asset, acting as a force multiplier in the conduct of intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance operations from remote locations, reducing 
or eliminating enemy contact. 
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11. System Development Approach 
The Raven development was somewhat unorthodox.  During its gestation 
period, the requirement evolved from the previously-discussed ACTDs on a rather 
ad hoc basis, outside of the formal Major Systems acquisition process.   Formal, 
Pentagon-staffed requirements documents did not exist until the Raven program 
was well into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD). 
SOCOM has acquisition authority that is independent of the Defense 
Acquisition Executive (DAE) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process and 
has their own, organic, Acquisition Executive.  Some in the Congress grew tired of 
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict being under-resourced by the military 
services during the annual budgeting process and passed legislation establishing 
both an independent acquisition and appropriations process for Special Operations.  
Acquisition programs are supposed to generally mirror the DoD Framework and be 
modified to fit SOCOM’s unique needs. 
This independence has facilitated reduced cycle times and more timely 
fielding of new equipment.  SOCOM’s requirements generation process is far less 
bureaucratic and cumbersome than the DoD’s processes.  Therefore, when SOCOM 
decided that Raven capability showed promise and the potential for high military 
utility, they proceeded with development faster and less formally than with 
conventional acquisitions.  Rather than starting with a “final” end-state requirements 
document, they used a “spiral development” method.  Mawn and Tokumaru (2005) 
page 2 described it in this way:   
Spiral development is characterized by an iterative cycle of requirements 
definition (and re-definition), prototyping, systems architecture development, 
and user feedback.  The development spiral is described in bullet form:  
 Concept is introduced to users. 
 Users identify requirements for the system. 
 Prototype is designed based on requirements 
 Users evaluate prototype (and requirements). 
 New requirements or design guidelines are created. 
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As success is achieved in each design cycle, the scope of each successive 
design cycle is increased to get closer to the final product and to include a 
larger representation of the user group(s). 
A basic premise of the development cycle is recognizing that the user may 
not be able to clearly articulate a particular requirement.  Most often the user 
is better at looking at an existing prototype and saying “these things I like,” 
and “these things I don’t like.”  During the development of the Pathfinder 
Raven SUAV, the Pointer SUAV [an earlier prototype] provided an initial 
reference point for both development and user feedback.  Using this method, 
significant progress was made toward a user-accepted product using 
relatively low cost prototypes. 
12. Issues 
In 2002, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
decided to procure the evolved Raven for operational employment in response to an 
Urgent-Combat Mission Needs Statement (C-MNS).  This meant that training had to 
be set up, manuals written and printed, and a limited logistics package developed.  
The Natick-AeroVironment Team had to establish a training cadre that consisted of 
many of the initial Raven developers.  As they began training soldiers, they 
discovered that interacting with them every day led to further refinements to the 
Raven to make it as “user-friendly” as possible.  Working with the students also 
facilitated the formulation of the necessary Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
(TTPs) for actual operational employment of the system.  In addition, as experience 
was gained, more subtle refinements were incorporated into Raven. 
Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) of Raven Block I began in May of 2003 and 
an improved Block II Raven configuration was cut into production in September of 
2003.  In early 2004, a Rucksack-Packable Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (RPUAV) 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD)  was formally adopted by United States 
Special Operations Command.  In the special operations world, urgency frequently 
outpaces the traditional acquisition process.35 
                                            
35 USOCOM wrote the ORD with the USASOC as the proponent.  The Army then adopted the ORD. 
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As the Raven became more successful, it attracted interest from 18th Airborne 
Corps and the U.S. Army Infantry School.  The latter being the official requirements-
developing activity for Infantry weapons.  Since the Raven had been born in the 
Special Operations world, it had not followed the traditional Mission Area Analysis 
(MAA) route that identified deficiencies in combat capability and evolved a Mission 
Need Statement (MNS) that then further evolved into an Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD).  At this time, the existing U.S. Army Project Manager-Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle- Small (PM-UAVS) became involved and an Urgent Need Statement 
(UNS) was promulgated, further production of the Block II Raven was funded, and 
deliveries were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Mawn and Tokumaru (2005) page 6 state that   
In early October, the training cadre deployed to Afghanistan with the Block II 
Pathfinder Ravens and conducted the first Raven training session.  
Employment of the SUAV in-theater exposed weaknesses, most notably in 
the tail control surface servos, the motor, and the IR camera shutter.  As each 
of these weaknesses surfaced, they were appropriately investigated and 
fixed. 
The system continued to show great promise and the U.S. Army exercised a 
buying option to increase their total buy to 179 3-bird systems.  Concurrently, 
the USSOCOM issued a Combat Mission Needs Statement for 59 systems.  
The system is now in full-rate production. 
13. Going Mainstream 
The challenge for Raven now became integration into the U.S. Army.  When 
Raven’s utility at the small unit level was finally realized by the Army-at-large (and 
the U.S. Marine Corps), it was outside of the mainstream research, development, 
and acquisition “system.”  There was no formal doctrine beyond the TTPs developed 
by SOCOM. Raven was not currently incorporated into the Army school system and 
needed to be quickly institutionalized.  In addition, there was resistance among 
some officers and units to this “model airplane.”  Its ISR capabilities were not 
intuitively obvious to field commanders.  
Jenkins and Snodgrass (2005) page 2 summarized:  
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Leader ‘buy-in’ to the Raven SUAV was recognized early by the Project 
Manager‘s office as being one of the most important issues for the success of 
the Raven system.  The PM office’s primary venue for gaining leader buy-in is 
the New Material Introductory Brief (NMIB).  This briefing informs the 
leadership of the Raven SUAV capabilities and limitations. The PM Office 
should continue educating commanders at all levels to ensure they are fully 
aware of the Raven SUAV and how much of a combat-multiplier the system 
really has become.   
Because Raven was so new to commanders, much of its doctrine was being 
developed “on-the-fly” by each of the small units that became convinced of its utility.  
Jenkins and Snodgrass (2005) page 2 continued:   
The differences in Raven SUAV usage among deployed commanders form 
the dichotomies between doctrine and practice with regard to this system.  
Using Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTML-PF) as a framework, we discovered that Doctrine is the 
component of DOTML-PF that has the most dichotomies when comparing 
“Doctrine” to “Practice” in Raven SUAV operations.  There are missions listed 
in the Raven TTP Manual that are executed as written and others that are 
modified to meet the commander’s operational needs. Furthermore, 
commanders are using the system to conduct missions that are not written in 
the Raven TTP Manual, but are of value and continue to preserve lives and 
increase unit effectiveness. 
These differences, which many key leaders have deemed the “commander’s 
innovativeness,” bring into focus whether there is an efficient and effective 
feedback loop for lessons learned.  The feedback loop for the Raven SUAV 
remains a work-in-progress as a result of its newness to the Army community.  
The current process for getting feedback information from the field is 
executed in two ways.  In some cases an Operational Assessment (OA) team 
will travel to theater to collect information, and then report it to the Department 
of the Army and TRADOC.  On other occasions, a Center or School House 
will do an independent survey either during or after a rotation by a certain 
unit.  Usually those surveys are After Action Reports (AAR) conducted shortly 
after a unit has returned.   
The bottom line is that because dichotomies exist between doctrine 
and practice in Raven SUAV usage, it is imperative that units capture the 
good and the bad while operating the system.  The mechanism for relaying 
this critical information from the field must be made standard and checks 
must be conducted to ensure that the information is put into doctrine for 
follow-on units to execute.” 
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As Jenkins and Snodgrass (2005) have indicated, stabilizing and 
communicating doctrine and evolving TTPs was a challenge.  The Project Manager 
UAVS, hosted several “feedback conferences” for commanders redeploying to the 
United States from Afghanistan and Iraq.  Reports from these conferences were 
widely disseminated and led improvements in both doctrine and TTPs.  Although 
institutionalization was initially challenging, Raven is now thoroughly accepted 
throughout the Infantry and Marine Corps. 
14. The Future 
One problem that is emerging for Raven (and other small UASs) is low 
altitude airspace congestion.  As Raven’s employment proliferates, the problem will 
worsen.  There are many different aircraft trying to operate over the same battlefield 
space in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Most of those at low altitude are relatively large 
helicopters operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).  Helicopter pilots are 
accustomed to watching out for and avoiding other helicopters and light, fixed-wing 
aircraft.  However, as Raven is a very small air vehicle, it is difficult for a fast-moving 
helicopter to see it in time to avoid a potential collision.  Great concern has been 
expressed by pilots that unless some better protocols are developed, serious 
crashes will occur.  Military aviation officials are studying the problem, but no clear-
cut solution has yet emerged. 
This concern has also been expressed in the civil aviation community in the 
United States as UASs also proliferate there.  There has been much discussion in 
the aviation press of a recent incident in which a developmental U.S. Navy UAS lost 
communications with its Maryland test site and flew into restricted airspace.  Civil 
aviation authorities also recognize the problem and are investigating potential 
solutions. 
Raven has been so successful, that users are demanding increased 
capability.  The fielded Block II Raven utilizes an electro-optical sensor for daylight 
operations and a thermal infrared sensor for night operations.  An analog downlink is 
used to transmit video and imagery data to the man-portable ground control station 
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for near real-time viewing.  Although the analog link has proven reliable, it consumes 
a far larger portion of bandwidth than a digital link would.  Starting in 2006, the U.S. 
Army’s Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center’s Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstration and Urban Technology Office, began 
development of a digital downlink for Raven.  The effort was funded by the DoD’s 
Office for Advanced Systems and Concepts and USSOCOM, and matched by prime 
contractor AeroVironment with company Independent Research and Development 
(IR&D) money. 
The digital data link’s intent is to establish the ability to provide greater range 
and increase the number of discrete SUAS communication channels fourfold, add 
relay capability, offer improved video clarity, and provide encryption capability.  A 
2009 experiment at White Sands Missile Range, NM, helped to further refine and 
develop the Digital Data Link (DDL) prototypes.  PM UAVS has contracted for 
production of 25 systems based upon the ACTD design.  Fifteen systems were set 
aside for a Brigade Combat Team to conduct a Military Utility Assessment (MUA).   
The PM is already planning on success; an Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) of 
2182 Raven systems has been established.  Plans are in development to retrofit the 
entire Raven fleet with the DDL. 
The actual Military Utility Assessment took place in Afghanistan from mid-July 
through mid-August 2010.  Nine Raven systems were evaluated by a U.S. Army 
Special Forces Battalion and flown from an active Special Forces Operating Base.  
These systems were left behind for the unit’s use during the remainder of their 
deployment. 
Fields (2009), page 7, concluded:  
The OCONUS MUA achieved the stated goal of demonstrating the DDL 
Raven SUAS in an operational environment.  Shortcomings in the Low Rate 
Initial Production (LRIP) system were identified that can be corrected prior to 
going into Full Rate Production (FRP).  The EXFOR [Exercise Force] was 
provided with training, operational systems, and short-term fixes for those 
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One of the most difficult challenges in DoD research and development is the 
transitioning of a demonstrated technology across what many have called “the valley 
of death,” into a fully-funded Program of Record (POR).  Many promising 
technologies initiate the process, but relatively few actually cross the valley and 
attain POR status; the Raven is one of the relatively few that has. 
The Raven has completed its transition into the “mainstream” acquisition 
process and is now PM-managed as an Acquisition Category (ACAT) III system by 
PM UAVS in Huntsville, AL.  The evolutionary development process continues as 
new increments are authorized, developed, and fielded to improve Raven’s 
capabilities and military utility.
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V. Concluding Remarks 
As noted, this report continues our research on international defense 
industrial affairs.  We continue seeking to highlight key developments in the global 
defense industrial complex, place those developments in context (especially with 
respect to global economics and contemporary military affairs), and offer new 
paradigms for understanding contemporary defense industries.  In this report we’ve 
continued our research into the ongoing KC-X affair, the C-27 as a case study in 
globalization of the aerospace and defense industries, and the rise of unmanned 
systems, with respect to their impacts on military affairs and defense industries. 
The attempt to replace U.S. Air Force tankers (with some form of KC-X) 
continues as a perfect storm of systemic dysfunctionalities—a nasty confluence of 
bureaucratic, legal, and political obstacles to carrying out public business.  What is 
especially noteworthy is that the usual explanation of technical ambition (pushing the 
envelope) most assuredly does not apply here.  Also, it illustrates well the pervasive 
potential for unresponsiveness in the U.S. defense acquisition system—a particularly 
worrisome issue in an era of hyper-adaptive warfare. 
The C-27 light military air transport is an excellent example of the growing 
integration of the aerospace industry along global lines.  Intended primarily as a 
replacement for various types of light air transports, it may well indicate that the 
primary motivation for acquiring new airplanes is replacement, rather than 
modernization.  (The KC-X is arguably a replacement aircraft also—and not part of 
fleet modernization.)  C-27 developments illustrate well the changing relationships 
involving the aerospace industries and the global defense market.  These 
relationships have been a major theme in our research agenda, and remain fruitful 
topics for further research. 
Finally, we have commenced a serious inquiry into the rise of unmanned 
systems—aerial vehicles (UAVs) in our case—including larger types such as Reaper 
and smaller aircraft such as Raven.  Unmanned military vehicles are likely to have a 
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pervasive effect on military affairs, the defense industrial base, and the acquisition 
system.   
Viewing unmanned systems as innovations, we have examined what may be 
viewed as two aspects of a common phenomenon—the introduction of new 
ideas/products into established institutions, large industrial corporations, and large 
military organizations.  This is a topic obviously worthy of further research—which 
we propose to do.  Fortunately, there is an interesting body of theory recently 
emerging (e.g., Baumol, 2002 and 2010) which can serve as a foundation for such 
inquiries. 
The relatively small size of development projects for unmanned aircraft has 
opened significant opportunities for smaller firms (like General Atomics), and smaller 
countries (such as Israel), to be major players in the unmanned systems market.  In 
particular, the relationships between larger and more experienced firms and smaller 
firms with good ideas, is a promising topic for continued study. 
Another interesting aspect of unmanned systems (such as Raven) is their 
origin in rapid-development programs outside the mainstream defense acquisition 
system.  The next test comes with the integration of the quick-reaction responses 
with the standard maintenance and logistics structure.  While Raven is an interesting 
example of dealing with the problem, a continued search for main themes in solving 
these problems is a valuable line of research.
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 79 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of References 
A310 MRTT. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved September 17, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A310_MRTT 
A330 MRTT. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved November 4, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A330_MRTT 
A-400M. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved August 12, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A400M 
AN-70 and AN-112KC (2010), In Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonov_An-
70 
Agence France Presse (AFP). (2010a, June 4). Boeing welcomes proposed U.S. bill 
on refueling tanker bid. Defense News. Retrieved from  
http://www.defensenews.com 
Agence France Presse (AFP). (2010b, July 21). EU appeals against WTO ruling on 
Airbus subsidies. Retrieved from 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iW1ZpLWNIw8xxi3V2
T_qTRLj31eg 
Alenia C-27J Spartan. (2009). Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft. Retrieved from 
http://www.janes.com 
Alenia North America. (2009). 
Allison, Graham. (1977), Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis, 
Boston: Little, Brown. 
Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow, (1999), Essence of Decision: Explaining the 
Cuban missile crisis, New York: Longman. 
Amani, L. (2009). SECDEF announces return of KC-X program. Air Force News 
Service. Retrieved from http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123168125 
A new world of unmanned systems (White paper). (2010, July). Aviation Week & 
Space Technology, http://www.scribd.com/doc/37915045/WP-New-World-
Unmanned-Systems 
Anselmo, J. C. (2010, July 21). Northrop chief: US export controls jeopardize UAV 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 80 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Antonov AN-12. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved August 12, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonov_An-12 
Antonov AN-70. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved August 12, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AN-70 
Antonov AN-124. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved August 12, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antonov_An-124 
Augustine, N. (1987). Augustine’s laws. New York, NY: Penguin. 
Baumol, W. J. (2002). The free market innovation machine. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Baumol, W. J. (2010). The microtheory of innovative entrepreneurship. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Beidel, E. (2010, October). Uncertainty, challenges mark future for military’s 
unpiloted aircraft. National Defense, 28-31. Retrieved from 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org 
Bennett, J. T. (2010a, July 2). In KC-X twist, Ukrainian aircraft maker, U.S. 
aerospace readying bid. Defense News. Retrieved from 
http://defensenews.com 
Bennett, J. T. (2010b, July 8). U.S. aerospace offers reasons KC-X bid might fail.  
Defense News. Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com 
Bialos, J. P. (2009). Fortresses and icebergs: The evolution of the transatlantic 
defense market and the implications for U.S, national security policy (vols. 1-
2). Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Johns Hopkins 
University. 
Big Safari. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved September 10, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Safari 
Blumenthal, L. (2010, September 21). Murray blasts Rossi on comments about 
Airbus subsidies. Miami Herald. Retrieved from http://www.miamiherald.com 
Boeing KC767. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved November 7, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_KC-767 
Bowie, C. J., & Isherwood, M. W. (2010, September). The unmanned tipping point. 
Air Force Magazine, 93(9). Retrieved from http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/September%202010/0910rpa.a
spx.     
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 81 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Butler, A. (2010a, April 27). EADS, Boeing squaring off again over tankers. Aviation 
Week. Retrieved from http://www.aviationweek.com 
Butler, A. (2010b, July 12). A lesson in sharing: Navy and Air Force agree to explore 
savings with Global Hawk, BAMS UAVs. Aviation Week, 27-28. 
Butler, A. (2010c, August 5). U.S. aerospace protests KC-X source selection. 
Aviation Week. Retrieved from http://aviationweek.com 
Butler, A. (2010d, August 26). Raytheon to look abroad for killer bee sales. Aviation 
Week. Retrieved from http://www.aviationweek.com 
Butler, A., & Barrie, D. (2006, June 16). Italy's JSF win. Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 164(25), 26-27. Retrieved from Business Source Complete. 
Buzanowski, J. G. (2009, June 12). Air Force Leaders Adopt ‘Balanced Approach’ to 
Budget, Workforce Revitalization [press release]. Retrieved March 23, 2010 
from http://www.af.mil 
C-130 Hercules. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved August 12, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_C-130_Hercules 
Canada—Air Force. (2010, March 25). Jane’s World Air Forces. Retrieved from 
http://www.janes.com 
Canadian Forces. (2010). Canada’s Air Force: CC-115 Buffalo. Retrieved March 25, 
2010 from http://www.forces.gc.ca 
Chaffee, N. T. (2009, June 12). Expanding fixed-wing aircraft capability in US Army 
aviation operations [Master’s thesis]. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command 
and General Staff College. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil 
Chase, S. (2009, January 6). B.C. [British Columbia] firm chasing $3-billion deal to 
modernize rescue plane. The Globe and Mail (Toronto), p. A4. Retrieved 
March 23, 2010 from LexisNexis Academic. 
Chief of Naval Operations, Strategic Studies Group XXVIII (CNO SSG). (2009, 
December). The unmanned imperative. Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College. 
Clark, N. (2010, January 13). Airbus criticizes latest U.S. Air Force specs for 
refueling tanker. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com. 
The cost of weapons. (2010, August 26). The Economist. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/node/16886851 
Defense Science Board. (2004, February). Defense Science Board study on 
unmanned aerial vehicles and uninhabited combat aerial vehicles. 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 82 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics. 
Department of Defense (DoD). (2009, April 6). FY2009–2034 unmanned systems 
integrated roadmap. Washington, DC. 
Department of Defense (DoD). (2010, February). United States Department of 
Defense fiscal year 2011 budget request. Retrieved from 
http://www.budget.mil 
Diamond, M. (2009, November 30). CONOP test finding success for Air Force in Iraq 
[press release]. Retrieved March 22, 2010 from http://www.af.mil 
Douglas, A. (2010, July 12). EADS KC-45 team arrives in Mobile. Retrieved from 
http://www.fox10tv.com/dpp/news/local_news/mobile_county/eads-kc-45-
team-arrives-in-mobile 
Drew, C. (2009, September 24). $35 billion tanker contract opens. New York Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com 
Drew, C. (2010a, July 9). Boeing bids for tanker, and overhauls 767 production. New 
York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com 
Drew, C. (2010b, September 16). A feud between Airbus and Boeing has given 
neither side a clear advantage. New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com 
Dunlop, M. (2010, August 3). Air Force's tanker deadline looks in doubt. Retrieved 
from http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20100803/BIZ/708039932 
EADS North America. (2010a, March 8). Statement from EADS North America on 
Northrop Grumman’s decision not to bid on the U.S. Air Force KC-X contract 
[Press release]. Retrieved from  
http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=186116 
EADS North America. (2010b, April 20). EADS North America intends to submit 
proposal for U.S. Air Force tanker [Press release]. Retrieved from 
http://www.kc45now.com/news-press-releases/04-20-2010.asp 
Ehrhard, T. (2010, July). Air Force UAVS: The secret history. Washington, DC: 
Mitchell Institute. 
Fields, A. (2009, August). Military Utility Assessment (MUA) of the Digital Data Link 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 83 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Franck, R. (2004). Innovation and the technology of conflict during the Napoleonic 
Revolution in military affairs. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 21(1), 
69–84. 
Franck, R., & Hildebrandt, G. (1996). Competitive aspects of the contemporary 
military-technical revolution. Defense Analysis, 12(2), 239–258. 
Franck, Raymond (2004), Innovation and the Technology of Conflict during the 
Napoleonic Revolution in Military Affairs,” Conflict Management and Peace 
Science, 21(1), 69-84. 
Franck, Raymond and Terry Pierce (2006, June), Disruptive Military Innovation and 
the War on Terror, Defense & Security Analysis, 22(2), 123-140. 
Franck, R., Lewis, I., & Udis, B. (2008a, January 1). Echoes across the pond: 
Understanding EU-US defense industrial relationships (NPS-AM-08-085). 
Retrieved from Naval Postgraduate School, Acquisition Research website:  
http://www.acquisitionresearch.net 
Franck, R., Lewis, I., & Udis, B. (2008b, September 1). New patterns of collaboration 
and rivalry in the US and European defense and aerospace industries (NPS-
AM-08-131). . Retrieved from Naval Postgraduate School, Acquisition 
Research website: http://www.acquisitionresearch.net 
Franck, R., Lewis, I., & Udis, B. (2010, April 1). Global cooperation and competition 
in the defense and aerospace industries (NPS-AM-10-005).  Retrieved from 
Naval Postgraduate School, Acquisition Research website: 
http://www.acquisitionresearch.net 
Franck, R., & Pierce, T. (2006, June). Disruptive military innovation and the War on 
Terror. Defense & Security Analysis, 22(2), 123–140. 
Fulghum, D. A. (2010a, August 9). Demystified: What the next generation jammer 
is—and is not—at least for the time being. Aviation Week, 48. 
Fulghum, D. A. (2010b, August 9). JSF Plus jammers: Sophisticated antiaircraft 
missile threats will endanger even stealthy designs.  Aviation Week, 46–47. 
Fulghum, D. A. (2010c, September 20). Past is prologue—Aircraft that can intercept 
ballistic missiles may be in vogue again. Aviation Week, 72–75. 
Fulghum, D. A., & Sweetman, B. (2009, December 14). Stealth over Afghanistan:  
US Air Force reveals it has flown a stealthy UAV operationally. Aviation 
Week, 26–31. 
Gertler, J. (2010, May 14). Air Force KC-X tanker aircraft program: Background and 
issues for Congress (FL34398). Retrieved from http://www.CRS.gov 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 84 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009, July). Defense acquisitions:  
Opportunities exist to achieve greater commonality and efficiencies among 
unmanned aircraft systems (GAO-09-520). Washington, DC.   
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2010, October 6). U.S. Aerospace, Inc. 
(File B-403464, B-403464.2). Washington, DC.   
Gunzinger, M. A. (2010). Sustaining America’s strategic advantage in long-range 
strike. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. 
Hammond, G. (2001). The mind of war: John Boyd and American security. 
Washington, DC: Smithsonian. 
Hasik, J. (2008). Arms and innovation. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Hazlett, J. (1995). Just in time warfare. In S. Johnson & M. Libicki (Eds.), Dominant 
battle-space knowledge (pp. 133–140). Washington, DC: National Defense 
University. 
Hennigan, W. R.. (2010, March 9). Northrop Grumman drops bid for aerial refueling 
tanker contract. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com 
Hirschberg, M. J. (2010, January). To boldly go where no unmanned aircraft has 
gone before: A half-century of DARPA’s contributions to unmanned aircraft. 
Orlando, FL: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics AIAA 2010, 
Report 158. 
History of unmanned combat air vehicles. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved 
September 12, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_unmanned_aerial_vehicles 
IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), Conference on Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems: Platforms, Payloads and Opportunities, Washington, DC, 13 
April.  This conference included presentations by Gen Michael V. Hayden 
(USAF Ret), Lt Gen David A. Deptula (USAF Ret), and Major Eric Weber 
(USAF), which are cited in the text above. 
Isherwood, M. (2008, August). Global hawk and persistent awareness: Sizing the 
global hawk fleet (Northrop Grumman Analysis Center Paper), 
http://www.northropgrumman.com/analysis-
center/paper/assets/Global_Hawk_Sizing_the_fleet.pdf  
Isherwood, M. (2010). Unmanned systems and the joint team. JFQ, 58(3), 57–61. 
Jane’s, (2010, January 25).  Procurement. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - 
North America. Retrieved February 21, 2010 from http://www.janes.com 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 85 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Jean, G. V. (2010). Army receives FAA approval to fly unmanned aircraft in national 
airspace. National Defense. Retrieved from 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org 
Jenkins, G., & Snodgrass, W. (2005, June). Cost performance tradeoffs for the Army 
to purchase one type of unmanned aerial vehicle to support the armor and 
infantry wartime requirements (MBA Professional report). Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School.  
KC-X. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved August 13, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KC-X 
Kington, T. (2009, May 25). Finmeccanica regroups in U.S. Defense News. 
Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com 
Knight, W., et al. (2008, February 28). Air Force refueling: The KC-X aircraft 
acquisition program. Retrieved from http://www.CRS.gov 
L-3 Communications. (2006, November 26). C-27J Spartan for the JCA program 
[Fact sheet]. Retrieved from http://www.c-27j.com 
Lockheed Martin 382 U/V Super Hercules. (2010, February 1). Jane’s All the World’s 
Aircraft. Retrieved from http://www.janes.com 
Los países compradores del A400M llegan a un acuerdo con Airbus. (2010, March 
5). El País (Madrid). Retrieved from http://www.elpais.com 
Lynn, W. J., Carter, A. B., & Donley, M. (2009, September 24). Moving forward. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/briefingslide.asx?briefingslideid=340 
Mahadevan, P. (2010, July). The military utility of drones. Zurich: Center for Security 
Studies, 78. 
Mao, T. T. (1960). On the protracted war. Beijing, China: Foreign Language Press. 
Masseret, J. P., & Gautier, J. (2009, February 10). L’Airbus militaire A400M sur le 
«chemin critique» de l’Europe de la défense [The Airbus military A400M on 
the “critical path” of European defense] (Sénat, France, session ordinaire de 
2008-2009, N° 205). Retrieved from http://www.senat.fr 
Matthews, W. (2010, February 24). Tanker RFP buoys Boeing backers, dismays 
Northrop allies. DefenseNews. Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com 
Mawn, A., & Tokumaru, P. (2005, November 29–December 2). The pathfinder raven 
small unmanned aerial vehicle (ADM001736). In Proceedings for the 24th 
Army Science Conference. Orlando, FL. 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 86 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Michaels, D. (2010, July 23). Rivals race for tanker deal. Wall Street Journal. 
Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com 
Miller, J., & Michaels, D. (2010, September 16). Boeing received illegal aid, WTO 
says. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com 
Muradian, V., & Reed, J. (2010, May 16). Boeing source: We may not bid for KC-X. 
Air Force Times. Retrieved from http://www.airforcetimes.com 
Neuman, S. G. (2009). Power, influence, and hierarchy: Defense industries in a 
unipolar world. In R. A. Bitzinger (Ed.), The modern defense industry (pp. 60–
94). Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. 
Northrop F-20 Tiger Shark. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved September 24, 2010, 
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northrop_F-20_Tigershark 
Northrop Grumman. (2010, March 8). Statement from Northrop Grumman on U.S. 
Air Force aerial refueling tanker program [Press release].Retrieved from 
http://www.Irconnect.Com/Noc/Press/Pages/News_Releases.Html?D=186116 
Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2005). Letter from al-Zawahiri to 
al-Zarqawi (ODNI news release No. 2–05). Retrieved from 
http://dni.gov/letter_in_english.pdf 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). (2010). Unmanned systems roadmap, 
2009–2034. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
Olean, R. (2008, November 7). Flying under the radar: RAVEN migrating to a new 
digital link. Retrieved from http://www.army.mil/news 
Peruzzi, L. (2009, September 29). US gathers transport aircraft for Afghan National 
Army Air Corps. International Defence Review. Retrieved from 
http://www.janes.com 
Procurement. (2010a, March 18). Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and 
Northeast Asia. Retrieved from http://www.janes.com 
Procurement. (2010b, March 23). Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Oceania. 
Retrieved from http://www.janes.com 
Ratnam, G. (2010, January 29). Northrop’s bush skipping tanker may show 
discipline. Business Week. Retrieved from http://www.businessweek.com 
Raytheon E-Systems (Alenia) C-27A Spartan upgrade. (2005). Jane’s Aircraft 
Upgrades. Retrieved from http://www.janes.com 
Reed, J. (2010a, March 10). USAF: We're sticking with tanker RFP. Defense News. 
Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 87 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Reed, J. (2010b, April 6). EADS talking with L-3 as potential KC-X supplier. Defense 
News. Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com 
Reed, J. (2010c, April 21). EADS confident its KC-45 can compete for USAF tanker 
bid. Defense News. Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com 
Ria Novisti. (2010, March 23). Russian firm denies rumors of U.S. aerial tanker bid. 
Retrieved from http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100322/158276984.html 
Sanders, P. (2010). Northrop drops Pentagon tanker bid. Wall Street Journal. 
Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com 
Scully, M. (2010, July 9). Boeing meets deadline for tanker bids. Retrieved from 
http://www.govexec.com 
Seifert, R. (2007, July). Gunships unleashed. Joint Forces Quarterly. Retrieved from 
http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,141012,00.html?ESRC=airforce-a.nl 
Shalal-Esa, A. (2010a, July 2). U.S. Aerospace and Antonov to bid for U.S. tanker. 
Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com 
Shalal-Esa, A. (2010b, September 20). EADS backer charges politics in tanker. 
Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com 
Shalal-Esa, A., & Jacobs, K. (2010, September 17). No evidence of Air Force tanker 
bid misconduct: GAO. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com 
Singer, P. W. (2009). Wired for war. New York, NY: Penguin Books. 
Sluka, Jeffrey(2010) “Death from Above: UAVs and Losing Hearts and Minds,” 
Military Review, May-June. 
Sirak, M. (2006, November 29). GAO denies Lockheed Martin’s protest over C-130J 
elimination in JCA contest. Defense Daily, 231(99), 1. 
Squitieri, T. (2006, December 14). Air Force boosts number of supply flights. USA 
Today. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com 
Talbot, G. (2010, June 11). EADS moves 100 employees to Mobile in preparation for 
air tanker bid. Retrieved from 
http://blog.al.com/live/2010/06/eads_moves_100_employees_to_mo.html 
Tiron, R. (2009, December 1). Northrop Grumman threatens to quit competition for 
tanker. Retrieved from http://thehill.com 
Tiron, R. (2010, September 20). Murray to try new tactic in Boeing-EADS fight. 
Retrieved from http://thehill.com 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 88 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Tran, P. (2010, March 17). France, Germany take issue with tanker competition. 
DefenseNews. Retrieved from http://www.defensenews.com 
Trimble, S. (2009, July 5). Manned turboprops may switch hands between USAF, 
Army. Flight International. Retrieved from 
http://www.flightglobal.com/home/default.aspx 
Trimble, S. (2010, July 2). US Aerospace explains Antonov bid for KC-X. Flight 
Global. Retrieved from http://www.flightglobal.com/home/default.aspx 
Udis, B. (2009). Offsets and international industrial participation. In R. A. Bitzinger 
(Ed.), The modern defense industry (pp. 257–271). Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-
CLIO. 
United Kingdom, House of Commons Defence Committee. (2010a, March 4). 
Defence equipment 2010: Sixth report of Session 2009-10 (HC 99). Retrieved 
from http://www.parliament.uk 
United Kingdom, House of Commons Defence Committee. (2010b, March 30). 
Defence equipment 2010: Government’s response to the Committee’s sixth 
report of Session 2009-10 (HC 516). Retrieved from http://www.parliament.uk 
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (2011), “The UK Approach to Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems,” Joint Doctrine Note 2/11, 30 March, pp. 2-7, and 3-1 to 3-
12. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles. (2010). In Wikipedia. Retrieved March 14, 2010, from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unmanned_aerial_vehicle 
U. S. Aerospace Inc. (2010). New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://topics.nytimes.com 
U.S. Aerospace News. (2010, October 6). US Aerospace Receives Notice from 
GAO, Retrieved from http://www.usaerospace.com/us-aerospace-receives-
notice-from-gao 
USAF receives first Afghan C-27. (2009, September 28). Air Force Magazine. 
Retrieved from http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/DRARCHIVE/Pages/default.aspx 
U.S. Air Force. (2009, September 25). KC-X Tanker modernization program 
(Solicitation Number: FA8625-10-R-6600-SpecialNotice). Retrieved from 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=713bc6e
87f1a76db2c2b20a4bee1e8a5&_cview=0&cck=1&au=&ck= 
U.S. Air Force. (2010, February 25). KC-X Tanker modernization program 
(Solicitation No: FA8625-10-R-6600). Retrieved from 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=




U.S. Army. (2008, September 12). The United States Army concept capability plan 
for Army aviation operations 2015-2024 (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-15). Fort 
Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. 
U.S. Department of Defense (2010), Quadrennial Defense Review Report, May.  
Available at 
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200700.pdf 
U.S. Embassy Mexico City. (1999, December). Transfer of the Panama Canal 
(Benjamin Franklin Library). Retrieved from 
http://mexico.usembassy.gov/bbf/bfdossier_PanamaCanal.htm 
U.S. Office of the President (2010), National Security Strategy, 27 May, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_str
ategy.pdf 
Wall, R., & Kingsley-Jones, M. (2010, September 20). Aiding and abetting. Aviation 
Week, p. 40. 
Wall, R., Taverna, M. A., & Flottau, J. (2010, March 15). Fully settling A400M 
contract issues to take months or more. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
172(11), 28–29. 
Warwick, G. (2010a, March 22). Boeing, Lockheed teams await Marines’ next step 
on cargo UAVs. Aviation Week & Space Technology, 172(12), 26–27. 
Warwick, G. (2010b, June 8). Making it happen—Traditional aerospace industrial 
base is taking note of step-child UAS sector. Aviation Week, 48–51.   
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Obama Announces First 
Steps Toward Implementation of the New U.S. Export Control System,” 9 
December 2010. 
World Trade Organization (WTO). (2010a, June 30). European communities and 
certain member states—Measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft 




World Trade Organization (WTO). (2010b, July 23). EU Appeal Of Ds316 Report, 2 
WT/DS316/12, (10-3984), EU and certain member states—Measures 
affecting trade in large civil aircraft, notification of an appeal by the European 
Union under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 90 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and under Rule 





World Trade Organization (WTO). (2010c, July 29). Summary of dispute settlement: 
Dispute DS353 United States — Measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft 
—Second complaint. Retrieved from  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds353_e.htm 
World Trade Organization (WTO). (2010d, August 16). DISPUTE DS316: European 
Communities—Measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft, current status: 
Panel report under appeal on 21July 2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds316_e.htm 
Wright, A. (2010). Army’s unmanned aviation fleet faces technological challenges. 
National Defense, 95(680), 26–27.  
Zucchino, D. (2010, July 6). Military’s drones beset by problems: Computer glitches 
and human error contribute to costly losses. And demand is only increasing. 
Los Angeles Times, p. 1. 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2003 - 2011 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 
 USMC Contingency Contracting 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 
 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition 
Budgeting Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-term Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 
 Evolutionary Acquisition 
 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= =  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our 



















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
  
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
